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363 
BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME, INC. V. 
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN RESOURCES:1 TO THE PREVAILING 
PARTY2 GOES THE SPOILS . . . AND THE 
ATTORNEY’S FEES! 
“He will guard the feet of his saints, but the wicked will be silenced in 
darkness.  It is not by strength that one prevails;”3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an action for violations of the Fair Housing Amendment Act4 
and the Americans With Disabilities Act,5 as in any fee-shifting statute 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598 (2001). 
 2. Prevailing party is defined as: “[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered regardless 
of the amount of damages awarded.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999). 
  The dissent in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628-29 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting), argued that the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition should not be treated as definitive.  Id. They cited several cases 
where they, the Supreme Court, had interpreted the dictionary’s definition as just a contextual 
reading, including Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395-96 
(1993) where the Supreme Court defined “excusable neglect” as used in Federal Rule Bankruptcy 
Procedure 9006(b)(1) more broadly than in Black’s Law Dictionary and United States v. Rodgers, 
466 U.S. 475, 479-480 (1984) where the Supreme Court adopted the “natural nontechnical” 
definition of the word “jurisdiction” used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and declined to confine the definition 
to “narrower, more technical meanings,” found in Black’s Law Dictionary.  Id. 
 3. 1 Samuel 2:9 (New International Version). 
 4. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT OF 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).  The section 
authorizing attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 3601 is 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1994) which reads: 
It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair 
housing throughout the United States.  In a civil action under subsection (a) of this 
section, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs. 
Id. 
 5. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). “An Act to 
establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability.”  Id.  
The section authorizing attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 is 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994) which 
reads: 
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or 
agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
1
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action, the plaintiff must first hire an attorney.6  The defendant then has 
the option of either hiring his or her own attorney to defend against the 
charges or of voluntarily changing his behavior to comply with the 
plaintiff’s demands.7  When the defendant decides that going to trial 
would not be an adequate solution to the conflict and makes a voluntary 
change of his behavior, the plaintiff can then try to recover as a 
prevailing party the attorney fees authorized by a fee-shifting statute.8  In 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health & Human Resources, the Supreme Court decided to deny the 
attorney fees for the claim brought under the Fair Housing Act and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, because the plaintiff did not qualify as 
a “prevailing party.”9  This ruling eliminated the use of the catalyst 
theory as a permissible basis for the prevailing party determination under 
a fee-shifting statute.10  Now, even if the plaintiff achieves the result that 
                                                                                                                                 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States 
shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual. 
Id. 
 6. See David Shub, Note, Private Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: 
Attorney’s Fee Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706, 706 (1992) (arguing that 
without an attorney’s aid, a victim of a civil rights violation will likely gain no relief). 
 7. John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439, 460 
(1986) (discussing that it is the parties’ inability to agree that causes litigation to occur.  Further 
arguing that in order for litigation to proceed a plaintiff must choose to sue and the defendant then 
must choose to defend). 
 8. Shub, supra note 6, at 706.  Though the plaintiff initially is unable to pay for legal 
services, an attorney will still be willing to take the case if there is an award of attorney fees 
“forthcoming if [the plaintiff’s] suit is successful.”  Id.  Further, the award of attorney fees ensures 
that an attorney will be willing to represent the plaintiff for a valid civil rights claim where the 
enforcement of the plaintiff’s rights aids the public interest, while it only results in an award of 
nominal damages.  Id. at 706-07.  Contra Leubsdorf, supra note 7, at 459 (arguing that “the 
defendant should not be held liable for lawfully resisting a claim” and lawfully resisting a claim 
should not treated as a liability, even if the plaintiff ultimately prevails). 
 9. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed 
the decision of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that the term “prevailing party” 
did not include a party that failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent 
decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a 
voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.  Id. at 600.  For examples of cases that Buckhannon 
overruled, see infra notes 63, 70, and accompanying text. 
 10. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.  The Court held that the “catalyst theory” is not a 
permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205.  Id. at 601-02. 
  Before the Buckhannon decision, the federal district courts used the catalyst rule to 
determine the qualification of a prevailing party.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625-26 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent supported the three-part test to determine a “prevailing party” under the 
catalyst theory.  Id. at 627-28.  The standard generally included three necessary conditions short of a 
favorable final judgment or consent decree.  Id.  The conditions were: (1) plaintiff had to show that 
the defendant provided “some of the benefit sought” by the lawsuit, (2) plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the suit stated a claim that was not “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” and (3) plaintiff 
2
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she wanted to achieve through the lawsuit, without the judgment on the 
merits or a court-ordered consent decree, the plaintiff is reimbursed for 
nothing.11 
This Note examines the definition of “prevailing party” as defined 
by the Supreme Court’s majority in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources where 
the case resulted in something short of a judgment on the merits.12  Part 
II provides a historical background of fee-shifting statutes, the 
development of fee-shifting in the United States, and the expansion of 
the catalyst theory by the district courts for prevailing parties under fee-
shifting statutes.13  Part III provides a statement of the facts, including 
the procedural history14 and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Buckhannon.15  Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “prevailing party” on fee-shifting statutes and their 
litigants.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The English and American Rules 
In trying to understand the role of attorney fees and the fee-shifting 
statutes in American society, one must first look at the origin of fee 
awards.  The United States began its history of awarding attorney’s fees 
with the method from England commonly known as the English Rule or 
                                                                                                                                 
must establish that her suit was a “substantial cause” or “a significant catalyst” of the defendant’s 
action providing relief.  Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“some of the benefit sought”), Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“frivolous, unreasonable or groundless”), and Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 
1982) (“substantial, significant catalyst”)).  But cf. Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal 
Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct, 55 
LA. L. REV. 217, 282-83 (1994).  The author presented the theory as a two-prong test: (1) whether 
the lawsuit was a material factor in the particular outcome and (2) whether the government’s 
voluntary change in approach, even if responsive to the lawsuit, was truly an acknowledgement of 
the strength of the party’s legal claim rather than a generous gesture.  Id. 
 11. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606.  “We cannot agree that the term prevailing party authorizes 
federal courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but 
nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached the sought-after 
destination without obtaining any judicial relief.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 12. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 13. See infra notes 17-70 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 98-134 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 135-230 and accompanying text. 
3
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the “loser pays” rule.17  In Colonial America, the adopted legislation 
reflected a desire to control the amount an attorney could charge a client, 
instead of a desire to award the prevailing party attorney fees.18  This 
began to change by the beginning of the formation of the new Union as 
many states implemented a fee-shifting method that benefited the winner 
of the litigation.19  In 1796, just after the country became independent, 
the United States adopted the method known as the American Rule20 and 
abandoned the English Rule.21  Each litigant must bear her own legal 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 17. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s 
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993).  In the English legal system, a “loser pays” 
rule applied where the successful litigant could collect his or her legal fees from the loser.  Id.  In 
early English courts of equity, the Chancellor could award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, 
but unless the losing party acted in an abusive manner, the Chancellor rarely granted the award.  Id. 
at 1570.  At common law, statutes were the sole basis for fee awards.  Id.  Only a victorious plaintiff 
could recover attorney fees in specific actions under the Statutes of Gloucester 1278.  Id.  Finally, 
two centuries later, a defendant was able to recover attorney fees in isolated cases.  Id. at 1570-71.  
Compare Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-54 (1929) (examining thoroughly the 
history of costs in England from 1275 to 1929). 
 18. Vargo, supra note 17, at 1571 (noting the colonies allowed attorney fee shifting).  There 
were several 17th-century colonial statutes that either totally denied attorney’s fees for services or 
denied paid attorneys access to the courts.  Id.  This antagonism toward attorneys appears to result 
from the suspicion and jealousy of the ruling class: 
In every one of the Colonies, practically throughout the Seventeenth Century, a lawyer 
or attorney was a character of disrepute and of suspicion, of whose standing or power in 
the community the ruling class, where it was the clergy as in New England, or the 
merchants as in New York, Maryland and Virginia, or the Quakers as in Pennsylvania, 
was extremely jealous.  In many of the Colonies, persons acting as attorneys were 
forbidden to receive any fee; in some, all paid attorneys were barred from the court; in 
all, they were subjected to the most rigid restrictions as to fees and procedure. 
Id. at 1571-72 (citing Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 4 (1913)). 
 19. Id. at 1574.  See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 11 (1984) (citing 1778 Va. Acts, ch. 14 § 5 in A 
COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND ORDINANCES OF THE 
CONVENTIONS OF VIRGINIA PASSED SINCE THE YEAR 1768, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 84 (Richmond 
1785), reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 84 (John Cushing comp.  Michael 
Glazier, Inc. 1982)).  In 1984, one study estimated that there were at least 1,974 state attorney fee-
shifting statutes across the United States.  Symposium, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We 
Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 325 (1984) (surveying 
and analyzing the state fee-shifting statutes). 
 20. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).  The Court stated after striking down 
an award of attorney fees on remittitur: 
We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed.  The general practice of the United 
States is in opposition to it; and even if the practice were not strictly correct in principle, 
it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute. 
Id.  This case is often cited as the first to recognize the general rule that attorney fees are not 
recoverable absent specific legislation allowing for the award.  Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 15. 
 21. See Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 12-14 (noting that the colonies did not need, nor could 
they afford the English system). 
4
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expenses under the American Rule.22  Courts continued to follow the 
American Rule during the 19th century.23  In the latter half of the 
century, legislators began recognizing that attorney fees needed to be 
reasonable in order to aid the plaintiff and not as a means to stop greedy 
attorneys.24  Exceptions to the American Rule began to evolve in the 
beginning of the 20th century.25  In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the American Rule in 
1977, but recognized that exceptions to the American Rule were 
available with Congressional guidance.26  In 1994, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its application of the American Rule absent explicit 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).  There has 
been much criticism of the American Rule because some scholars believe that it has encouraged 
people to initiate litigation just to gain discovery or to file frivolous actions to force the defendant to 
settle for an amount somewhat less than what the potential litigation would cost.  See Neal H. 
Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding 
Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300 (1986), for a criticism generally of the 
American Rule and see William Tetley, Q.C., A Canadian Looks at American Conflict of Law 
Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of the American Legal and Social Systems (Corrective 
vs. Distributive Justice), 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299 (1999), for a review of the theory and 
practice of the laws in the United States from a Canadian perspective. 
 23. Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 22-23 (noting the courts continued to show willingness to 
apply the American rule).  The courts denied awarding attorney’s fees as costs.  Id. at 23.  They 
struck down statutes that shifted fees because the statutes violated the Due Process or Equal 
Protection clauses of the Constitution.  Id. 
 24. Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 25.  The legislators began to make exceptions to the 
American Rule such as the voting rights legislation of 1870, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
and the Sherman Act of 1890.  Id. 
 25. Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 29 (recognizing the bad faith and common fund doctrines as 
exceptions to the American rule); Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of 
Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 
1864-65 (1998) (noting that several exceptions to the American Rule permit recovery of attorney 
fees by a plaintiff, such as the bad faith doctrine and the common fund theory). The bad faith 
doctrine “awards attorney fees against parties who litigate in bad faith.”  Leubsdorf, supra, at 29.  
The common-fund doctrine imposes fees on the class that would have had to pay legal fees if the 
action was brought for the benefit of the individual claimant.  19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2487.  
For example, in a shareholders’ derivative action, the obligation to reimburse a successful plaintiff 
falls on the corporation on whose behalf the action was taken if the corporation derived a benefit 
from the plaintiff’s success.  Id. 
 26. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247.  “[W]e are convinced that it would be 
inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of 
litigation. . . .”  Id.  In this case, an environmental group attempted to prevent the issuance of 
construction permits by the Secretary of the Interior for the building of the trans-Alaskan oil 
pipeline.  Id. at 241.  The Court’s decision focused on the legislative and judicial power to authorize 
attorney’s fee awards under the American Rule.  Id. at 257-59.  Its decision limited the court’s 
power to award fees pursuant to statutory fees provisions and the federal courts’ use of their 
equitable powers to award attorney’s fees.  Id. at 247. 
5
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congressional authorization in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States.27 
B.  Fee-shifting Statutes 
Congress introduced fee-shifting statutes to encourage individuals 
to use private enforcement for the implementation of public policies.28  
These provisions allow courts to order the losing party to pay the 
prevailing party’s reasonable29 attorney fees.30  The Americans With 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).  In this case, the plaintiffs were 
partially responsible for contaminating a landfill and they brought an action under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 
against the United States to recover a share of its cleanup costs from the other responsible parties.  
Id. at 811.  The Court found that precedent established that attorney’s fees were generally not a 
recoverable cost of litigation “absent explicit congressional authorization.”  Id. at 814.  They 
concluded that under the general practice, CERCLA § 107 did not provide for the award of private 
litigants’ attorney’s fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action.  Id. at 819. 
 28. Vargo, supra note 17, at 1588-89.  The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 
the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act of 1977, the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, and the Freedom of Information Act are all examples of fee-shifting statutes adopted by 
Congress.  Id.  See, e.g., Da-Wai Hu, Comment, Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties and 
Fee Shifting under ERISA, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 218 (2000).  As part of its remedies, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides for courts to award attorney’s 
fees to parties litigating employee benefit claims covered by the law.  Id. at 218.  Courts applying 
the statute have held that only prevailing parties should be awarded attorney’s fees.  Id.  See also, 
Joseph T. Phillips, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Impact, 
Outcomes, and the Future Viability of Environmental Citizen Suits, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1307 
n.21 (2000).  Attorney’s fees clauses can be found in the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994), the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f) (1994), the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1994), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1994), and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).  Id. 
 29. E.g., WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT OF 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(3) (1994) 
(authorizing that “[i]f an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment is the prevailing 
party in an appeal . . . the agency involved shall be liable . . . for reasonable attorney’s fees and any 
other reasonable costs incurred, regardless of the basis of the decision”) (emphasis added); see infra 
note 33 for further examples of these statutes.  Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) 
(stating that it is left for the district courts to determine what is reasonable when awarding attorney 
fees).  See Catherine C. Blake, Rules and Guidelines For the Management of Attorney’s Fees, 27 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing generally the lodestar method of awarding reasonable attorney 
fees); Jean B. Arnold & Mark Chestnutt, Commentary, Attorneys’ Fees in Special Education Cases 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 497, 502 (1995) (defining 
a lodestar as the prevailing hourly rate of comparable attorneys in the same community multiplied 
by the hours spent on the case—subject to the numbers of hours being reasonable).  Compare 
Gregory W. Bachmann, Note, Professional Fees in Bankruptcy: Tailoring the Johnson Factors to 
Suit Bankruptcy, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 453, 453 (1993) (advocating and discussing the 
“Johnson” factors as adopted to determine attorney fees for bankruptcy proceedings).  See generally 
6
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Disabilities Act31 and the Fair Housing Act32 are two such provisions.33  
                                                                                                                                 
Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999, 999 (2001) (examining the calculations 
of attorney fees that prisoners can recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE 
SHEEHEY, AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 95-117 (1994) available 
at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/ism_recent_publications (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) 
(presenting management strategies for controlling attorney fees). 
 30. E.g., Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-
Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2001) (discussing the fee-shifting methods and the 
calculations of attorney’s fees where the loser must pay the prevailing party). 
  Vargo, supra note 17, at 1589-90.  Fee-shifting can be divided into one-way shifts and 
two-way shifts.  A one-way shift occurs when the legislature or the courts have determined that fees 
are to be shifted in favor of only one party.  Id.  Thus, if the plaintiff were the chosen beneficiary, a 
successful plaintiff would recover attorney’s fees while a successful defendant would not.  Id. at 
1590.  The two-way shift is the loser-pays rule commonly attributed to the English system.  Id.  In 
this system, the loser whether plaintiff or defendant must pay the winner’s attorney’s fees.  Id.  
Many scholars disagree with the notion of the one-way shift.  E.g., Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to 
Adapt a Two-way Fee Shift for Low Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1988).  This Note 
proposes a two-way shift requiring that courts automatically assess attorney’s fees against the losing 
party’s attorney.  Id. at 1242.  Potential litigants would be less likely to sue under a two-way fee 
shift if they are unsure of the merits of the case because liability will be higher than under the 
American Rule.  Id. at 1247.  For a general overview of fee-shifting and its effects on different types 
of claims and litigants, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 153-54 (1984) (discussing that the one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff 
rule would discourage litigants of modest means to stand on plausible, but not clearly strong 
defenses, because the rule would have all the negatives of the English rule without any prospect of 
reimbursement). 
 31. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).  See supra note 
5 for text of authorizing fee provision. 
 32. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT OF 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).  See supra note 4 for 
text of authorizing fee provision. 
 33. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (acknowledging that Congress has “authorized the award of attorney’s fees to 
the ‘prevailing party’ in numerous statutes” in addition to the ADA and the FHAA, and that “these 
fee-shifting provisions [have been interpreted] consistently”).  See, e.g., WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(3) (1994) (authorizing that “[i]f an employee, former 
employee, or applicant for employment is the prevailing party in an appeal . . . [the] agency 
involved shall be liable . . . for reasonable attorney’s fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, 
regardless of the basis of the decision”) (emphasis added); WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT OF 
1989, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) (1994) (stating “[i]f an employee or applicant for employment is the 
prevailing party . . . the employee or applicant shall be granted the relief”) (emphasis added); 
IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL ACT OF 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(h) (1994) (allowing “in the 
judge’s discretion . . . prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees [in a complaint with respect to 
an unfair immigration related employment practice]) (emphasis added); OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED 
RESCISSIONS & APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1864(e) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (stating in 
a civil action, “court may award, in addition to monetary damages for any injury resulting from an 
alleged . . . costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, to any 
prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is 
appropriate”) (emphasis added); THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 ed. & Supp. IV 1998) (stating “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 
92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 
7
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The Supreme Court held that the lower courts should normally award 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff absent special circumstances 
that would make such an award under 42 U.S.C. § 198834 unjust.35  The 
treatment of defendants in receiving an award of attorney fees is 
different than that of plaintiffs.36 
A prevailing defendant usually only receives a payment of attorney 
fees from a losing plaintiff when the plaintiff’s case is “frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in 
subjective bad faith.”37  This difference in application stems from the 
                                                                                                                                 
2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 
13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. . . .”) (emphasis added); PRISON LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT OF 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (authorizing payment to 
prisoners for any action “in which attorney’s fees are authorized” and shall be awarded to the extent 
“the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation”) (emphasis added); 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (b) (1994) (stating “the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”) (emphasis 
added); CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1994) (stating “the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as 
part of the costs”) (emphasis added); VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 
1973 l(e) (authorizing that at the court’s discretion, it may award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney fees).  See generally, Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of 
Brennan, J., dissenting).  In his appendix, Justice Brennan divided over 100 fee-shifting statutes into 
three broad categories: (A) statutes that refer to attorney fees “as part of the costs,” (B) statutes that 
do not refer to attorney fees as part of the costs, and (C) statutes that may or may not refer to 
attorney fees as part of the costs.  Id. at 43-44.  He then listed many of the enumerated statutes that 
authorized court-awarded attorney fees by the time of judgment in 1985.  Id. at 44-51.  Compare 
Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney Fees Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 733, 769-72 (1993) (examining the fees available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988). 
 34. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 
ed. & Supp. IV 1998). See supra note 33 for the text of the authorizing fee provision. 
 35. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (holding that Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to allow a 
reasonable attorney fee to a prevailing party).  Fees should be awarded for hours that were 
reasonably expended.  Id. at 434.  “Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client . . . are not 
properly billed to one’s adversary. . . .”  Id.  Fees can be adjusted upward or downward based on the 
results obtained.  Id. 
 36. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 
421 (1978) (agreeing with the Second Circuit in Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d 
Cir. 1975), that an attorney fees award to a successful defendant should not be permitted when he 
simply succeeds).  Klausner, supra note 22, at 311 (“It is a rare occasion . . . when the court invokes 
its inherent equitable power [against a plaintiff]”). 
 37. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 (holding that in a Title VII case, an award 
of attorney fees may be given to a prevailing defendant based on the frivolous, unreasonable action 
brought by the plaintiff).  See, Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1975), for an 
example of a plaintiff’s frivolous suit where the defendant was awarded attorney fees.  In Carrion, 
the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the defendant alleging discrimination in the work 
place for a suspension and ultimately a discharge for insubordination.  Id. at 723.  The Second 
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belief that awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs would 
encourage individuals to seek relief from the courts when their rights 
had been violated compared to a defendant whose rights had not been 
impinged.38  Additionally, many fee-shifting statutes were enacted to 
encourage beneficial litigation that would further substantive goals of 
the underlying statutes including civil rights and environmental laws.39 
In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., the Supreme Court held that courts 
could not award attorney fees for the plaintiff acting as a private attorney 
general until Congress made specific guidelines for awarding of fees.40  
                                                                                                                                 
Circuit found no evidence to support her claim, but that there was substantial evidence to support 
the unjustified insubordination by the plaintiff that resulted in her discharge.  Id. at 726.  In deciding 
the issue of attorney fees, the court found that the plaintiff acted vindictively, deliberately perjured 
herself and was motivated only by malice.  Id. at 728.  They found the lawsuit completely without 
merit.  Id.  They affirmed the attorney fees awarded to the defendant.  Id. at 728-29. 
 38. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 418-19 (holding plaintiff is the chosen 
instrument by Congress to vindicate rights and when a district court awards counsel fees to a 
prevailing party, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law).  See also, Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (noting that a plaintiff bringing a suit under 
Title II is vindicating a right not only for himself but as a private attorney general and is vindicating 
that right, a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority) (internal quotations omitted); 
Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees to Prevailing Civil 
Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE. 535, 538 (1989) (arguing that through several 
decisions, the Supreme Court has overridden the intent of Congress in fee-shifting statutes to allow 
the prevailing plaintiff to recover fees).  Attorneys have been forced to withdraw from the civil 
rights practice for financial reasons and therefore, many civil rights plaintiffs cannot find counsel to 
represent them.  Sternlight, supra, at 538.  Even when the plaintiff’s counsel is successful, they 
cannot be certain of receiving full compensation for all the hours expended in the litigation.  Id. at 
549. 
 39. See, e.g., Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of Attorney’s Fees 
in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the “Appropriate” Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 
318-20 (1984) (discussing that the statutes were enacted to encourage beneficial litigation); Monica 
Dias, Note, Morris-Smith v. Moulton Niguel Water District: The Double Standard for Attorney 
Fees under the Clean Water Act, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 549, 572 (2000) (noting that civil rights and 
environmental laws have the common purpose of promoting citizen enforcement of important 
federal policies). 
 40. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1977) (holding that 
without Congressional guidance, the judiciary could not determine the attorney’s fees to be awarded 
or the range of discretion given to the judiciary in making the attorney’s fees awards).  The private 
attorney general doctrine occurred when a plaintiff brought a suit for the private enforcement of a 
Congressional policy under a fee-shifting act.  Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Award of Attorney’s 
Fees to Prevailing Parties in Actions under Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(C), 159 A.L.R. 
FED. 279 (2001).  Many scholars disagree with the Court’s holding in Alyeska for policy reasons.  
See Carl Cheng, Comment, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. 
L. REV. 1929, 1929-35 (1985).  The private attorney general doctrine gave courts the discretion to 
award attorney’s fees to a party who vindicated a right that (1) benefited a large number of people, 
(2) required private enforcement, and (3) was of societal value.  Id.  California failed to follow the 
Supreme Court’s lead in rejecting the private attorney general doctrine.  Id. at 1935.  Even in 
California, though, the use of the doctrine left its application unpredictable because of vague and 
subjective inquiries.  Id. at 1929.  See also, Shub, supra note 6, at 710 (arguing the legislative 
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The Court reasoned “the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees 
[were] to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making 
those awards are matters for Congress to determine.”41  Congress 
responded by enacting § 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act 
that authorized fee awards to a “prevailing party.”42 
C.  Prior Influential Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of who is the prevailing 
party in a lawsuit under a fee-shifting statute many times.43  In Maher v. 
Gagne,44 the Supreme Court held that a party did not need to go to trial 
and receive a favorable judgment.45  A consent decree46 or favorable 
settlement47 was enough to prevail.48  When a plaintiff wins a judgment 
                                                                                                                                 
history clearly indicates that Congress responded and authorized the award of attorney fees in the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to counteract the effects of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Alyeska). 
 41. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 262.  The Court compared the antitrust laws where 
attorney fee awards were mandatory and patent litigation where attorney fee awards may be 
awarded at the court’s discretion.  Id. at 261.  Because the statutory allowances of fees were 
available in a variety of circumstances and these circumstances differed, Congress needed to 
determine what justifies an award of attorney fees for the private attorney general.  Id. at 261-63. 
 42. P.G. Szczepanski, Note, For a Few Dollars Less: Equity Rides Again in the Denial of 
Section 1988 Attorney’s Fees to a Prevailing Plaintiff in Farrar v. Hobby, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 219, 228 (1996) (recognizing that Congress reacted within two months of the Alyeska 
decision by introducing § 1988); Cheng, supra note 40, at 1934 (noting “[t]he reaction to the 
Alyeska decision was immediate”). 
 43. See ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, supra note 29, at 7-13 (discussing generally the 
cases decided through 1994, by the Supreme Court relating to attorney fees and the issue of who is 
the prevailing party). 
 44. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).  In this case, the respondent filed a complaint alleging that 
Connecticut’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children regulations denied her credit for substantial 
portions of her actual work-related expenses.  Respondent also alleged the regulations violated 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) and § 402(a)(7), as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  She then argued relief was authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 124-
25.  The Court held that the fact the respondent prevailed through a settlement, rather than through 
litigation, did not weaken her claim to fees.  Id. at 129.  They found that nothing in the language of 
§ 1988 that conditions the district court’s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a 
judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated.  Id.  They followed the wording 
of the S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912, that “for 
purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they 
vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.”  Id. 
 45. Id. at 129. 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999).  A consent decree is defined as: “a court 
decree that all parties agree to.”  Id. 
 47. Id. at 1377.  A settlement is “an agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit.”  Id. 
 48. Maher, 448 U.S. at 129.  See also, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 719 (1986).  The issue 
in Evans was whether attorney’s fees must be assessed when the case has been settled by a consent 
decree that granted protective relief to the plaintiff class but provided the defendants should not pay 
any part of the prevailing party’s fees or costs.  Id. at 720.  The plaintiff was a class of children that 
10
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on at least some of the merits of his claims, he is a “prevailing party” 
according to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hewitt v. Helms.49 
Following Hewitt,50 the Supreme Court in Rhodes v. Stewart51 held 
that a declaratory judgment was no different from any other judgment 
and would constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it 
affected the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.52  In Texas 
                                                                                                                                 
suffered from emotional and mental handicaps who would have been placed in the care of the 
defendant for education and treatment.  Id.  They alleged violations of the United States 
Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, four federal statutes, and provisions of the Idaho Code.  Id. at 
720-21.  The Court found that Congress expected fee shifting to attract competent counsel to 
represent citizens deprived of their civil rights and Congress neither bestowed fees upon attorneys 
nor rendered them nonwaivable or nonnegotiable; instead, it added Congress to the arsenal of 
remedies available to combat violations of civil rights, a goal not inconsistent with conditioning 
settlement on the merits on a waiver of statutory attorney’s fees.  Id. at 731-32.  The Supreme Court 
then held that the district court had the power, in its sound discretion, to refuse to award fees.  Id. at 
719.  Scholars have since argued that this decision would work against potential plaintiffs with civil 
rights claims that could not afford to engage a competent attorney to represent them.  See, e.g., 
Randy M. Stedman, Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting Private Attorneys General on Waiver, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1289 (1988) (arguing that the majority of the Supreme Court did not take 
notice that Congress intended fees to act as an incentive to members of the private bar to undertake 
civil rights cases). 
 49. 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987).  This case addressed whether a party who litigated to 
judgment and lost on all claims can nonetheless be a “prevailing party” for purposes of an award of 
attorney fees.  Id. at 757.  An inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute brought a 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging a violation of Due Process rights.  Id.  Before any decision was 
rendered, the plaintiff was released from prison on parole.  Id.  Through the lengthy proceedings, 
the only relief that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his claim should not have been 
dismissed for failure to state a Constitutional claim.  Id. at 760.  The Supreme Court therefore held 
he was not eligible for fees in the § 1988 action because he was not a prevailing party under the 
statute as he had not prevailed in his suit.  Id. at 763-64.  Furthermore, the Court held: 
A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff 
all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment—e.g. a monetary settlement or a 
change in conduct that redresses the plaintiff’s grievances.  When that occurs, the 
plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his 
favor. 
Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61. 
  This reasoning followed their prior decision in Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 754 
(1980) (per curiam).  In this case, the plaintiffs also sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to recover attorney 
fees after alleging a violation of their constitutional rights.  Id. at 754-55.  The Court held that the 
intent of Congress to permit recovery of attorney fees on an interlocutory award should only be 
given to a party who has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claim, either 
in the trial court or on appeal.  Id. at 757.  The plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery in this case 
because the only relief they achieved was that the court of appeals held the respondents were 
entitled to a trial of their cause but nothing more.  Id. at 758. 
 50. 482 U.S. 755. 
 51. 488 U.S. 1 (1988). 
 52. Id. at 4.  In Rhodes, the plaintiffs while in custody of the Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction, brought a complaint alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by officials who refused to allow them to subscribe to a magazine.  Id. at 2.  The 
court ordered that the correction officers had not applied the proper procedural and substantive 
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State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent School District,53 the 
Supreme Court rejected a test for prevailing party status that required a 
party to prevail on a central issue in the litigation and not merely upon 
significant secondary issues.54 
Later in Farrar v. Hobby,55 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff 
                                                                                                                                 
standards in denying the inmates their request and ordered compliance with those standards.  Id.  
After entry of a judgment for the plaintiffs in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that there was “no 
entitlement to attorney’s fees, however, unless the requesting party prevails; and by the time the 
District Court entered its judgment in the underlying suit one of the plaintiffs had died and the other 
was no longer in custody.”  Id.  The Court then found that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties 
under the rule set forth in Hewitt.  Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 2.  The Court added quoting Hewitt: 
The real value of the judicial pronouncement—what makes it a proper judicial resolution 
of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion—is in the settling of some 
dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.”  
Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 1 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761). 
 53. 489 U.S. 782 (1989). 
 54. Id. at  789-90.  In Garland, the petitioners brought their lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because of the school district’s 
policy prohibiting communication by or with teachers during the school day concerning employee 
organizations.  Id. at 785.  The district court found for the petitioner on one issue of only minor 
significance and found against the petitioners on their other claims.  Id. at 785-86.  The petitioners 
then filed for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Id. at 787.  The district 
court recognized that the petitioners had achieved partial success, but indicated that “in this circuit 
the test for prevailing parties is whether the plaintiff prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the 
primary relief sought.”  Id. at 787.  The Court held that it was clear that the central issue test applied 
by the lower courts was contrary to the holding of Hensley.  Garland, 489 U.S. at 790.  The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the wording that they adopted in Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, from Nadeau 
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978): If the plaintiff has succeeded on “any significant 
issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,” the 
plaintiff had crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind, not just an issue central to the 
litigation.  Id. at 792.  They affirmed Hewitt that a plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of 
the dispute that changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant in order to be 
considered a prevailing party under § 1988.  Id.  The Court then held that the touchstone of the 
prevailing party inquiry must be a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a 
manner that Congress sought to promote in the fee-shifting statute.  Id. at 792-93.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court decided that by looking at the facts, the petitioners had obtained a judgment 
vindicating the First Amendment right of public employees in the workplace and therefore qualified 
as a prevailing party.  Id. at 793. 
 55. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).  In Farrar, the plaintiff sued for monetary and injunctive relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985.  Id. at 106.  The jury in the district court found that while all of 
the defendants except Hobby had conspired against the plaintiffs, this conspiracy was not a 
proximate cause of any injury suffered by the plaintiffs.  Id. The jury then found that Hobby had 
committed an act or acts under color of state law that deprived plaintiff of a civil right, and yet, 
Hobby’s conduct was not a proximate cause of any damages suffered by the plaintiff and that each 
party bear their own costs.  Id. at 106-07.  Because Hobby had deprived Farrar of a civil right, 
Farrar was entitled to nominal damages.  Id. at 107.  The plaintiffs then sought attorney’s fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Id. The Supreme Court held that to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights 
plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim and the plaintiff must obtain an 
12
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who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988.56  The 
Court further held that while the mere attainment of damages was 
enough to alter the legal relationships between the parties, the amount 
attained had bearing on the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded 
under a fee-shifting statute.57  In dicta, the Court noted that to qualify as 
a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief 
on the merits such as an enforceable judgment or comparable relief 
through a consent decree or settlement.58 
D.  Prevailing Party under the Catalyst Theory 
Before 1994, there was one other option that a plaintiff could 
exercise to receive an award of attorney fees as a prevailing party.59  The 
                                                                                                                                 
enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom the fees were sought or comparable relief 
through a consent decree or settlement.  Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111.  In civil rights litigation, only 
those circumstances that materially affect the legal relationship of the parties by modifying the 
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff, can transform the plaintiff into a 
prevailing party.  Id. at 111-12 (internal quotations omitted). “[A] technical victory may be so 
insignificant . . . as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status.”  Id. at 113 (quoting 
Garland, 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)).  “Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal 
relationship between the parties, the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the 
reasonableness of a fee award.”  Id. at 114 (internal quotations omitted).  When a plaintiff recovers 
only nominal damages because of a failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary 
relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all as “fee awards under § 1988 were never 
intended to produce [a] windfall[] to attorneys.”  Id. at 115 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 56. Id. at 112. 
 57. 506 U.S. at 114.  See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney Fees Against the 
Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (1993) (arguing that Farrar lowered the threshold to 
qualify as a prevailing party but that “even a party who had prevailed may be denied a fee award”). 
 58. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. 
[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief 
on the merits of his claim.  The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the 
defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or 
settlement.  Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of 
the judgment or settlement.  Otherwise, the judgment or settlement cannot be said to 
“affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.”  Only under these 
circumstances can civil rights litigation effect the material alteration of the legal 
relationship of the parties and thereby transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party.  In 
short, a plaintiff “prevails” when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters 
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a 
way that directly benefits the plaintiff. 
Id. at 111-12. 
 59. E.g., Russell & Gregory, supra note 39, at 318-20 (acknowledging Congress enactment of 
100 statutory provisions authorizing courts to award fees to prevailing parties under the catalyst 
theory); Sisk, supra note 10, at 277-89 (stating that a plaintiff may recover attorney fees when its 
lawsuit acts as a catalyst in prompting the defendant to take favorable action that results in mooting 
the lawsuit). 
13
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courts of appeals adopted the catalyst theory60 that even if they did not 
obtain a judgment on the merits, plaintiffs could obtain a fee award if 
their suit acted as a “catalyst” for the change in the defendants’ behavior 
that was sought in bringing the lawsuit.61 
Leading the way in these decisions was the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which in 1978, concluded that plaintiffs might be considered to 
have prevailed for attorney’s fee purposes if they had succeeded on any 
significant issue in the litigation, which achieved some of the benefit the 
party sought in bringing the lawsuit.62  Twelve additional circuit courts 
followed their lead over the next eleven years, which allowed prevailing 
plaintiffs awards of attorney fees without a judgment on the merits or 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 60. See supra note 10 (describing the catalyst theory). 
 61. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978) (recognizing that attorney fees 
are justified when the plaintiff’s lawsuit acts as a catalyst in prompting the defendant to take action 
to meet the plaintiff’s claims even though there was not judicial involvement in reaching that 
result).  Compare Joel H. Trotter, Note, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After 
Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (1999) (arguing to foreclose the catalyst theory but 
allow an exception to the mootness doctrine to enable a plaintiff to obtain an enforceable judgment 
and recover fees). 
 62. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79.  In Nadeau, the plaintiffs were inmates in protective custody 
who brought a § 1983 suit alleging that their conditions of confinement violated various provisions 
of the Constitution.  Id. at 277.  The district court concluded that the allegations were supported and 
awarded significant injunctive relief to the plaintiff.  Id.  After a reversal by the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the parties entered into a consent decree upon which the plaintiffs moved for an award 
of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Id.  The district court denied the fees because they 
were not a prevailing party.  Id.  The district court agreed that the consent decree entered into 
resulted in considerable improvement for the plaintiff class as compared to the conditions that they 
were subjected to prior to the institution of the suit.  The court, however, concluded that fees were 
inappropriate because the improvement reflected not only the intensive work and effort of the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, but also a good faith effort on the part of the defendants to improve the 
conditions at the New Hampshire State Prison.  Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 277-78 (internal quotations 
omitted).  After examining the legislative history, the court of appeals concluded that plaintiffs may 
be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeeded on any significant 
issue in the litigation that achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.  Id. at 
278-79.  They continued, “it is often explained that when plaintiff’s lawsuit acts as a ‘catalyst’ in 
prompting defendants to take action to meet plaintiff’s claims, attorney’s fees are justified despite 
the lack of judicial involvement in the result.”  Id. at 279.  The court found that good faith of the 
defendants was not a controlling factor in determining whether or not plaintiffs merit an award.  Id. 
at 280.  They considered the chronological sequence of events to be an important, though not 
definitive, factor in determining whether or not the defendant could reasonably be inferred to have 
guided his actions in response to the plaintiff’s lawsuit.  Id. at 281.  If the plaintiff established that 
their suit was causally related to the defendants’ actions that improved their condition, they have 
merely passed the factual test; they must still pass the legal test.  Id.  If it has been judicially 
determined that defendant’s conduct, however beneficial it may be to the plaintiff’s interests, is not 
required by law, then defendants must be held to have acted gratuitously and plaintiffs have not 
prevailed in a legal sense.  Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281.  See also supra note 10 and accompanying text 
for additional discussion on the catalyst theory. 
14
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obtaining a consent decree.63  This added additional support to the 
catalyst theory.64 
E.  The Fourth Circuit Breaks Away 
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a divided en banc 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 63. E.g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that “while a fee award 
may be predicated on a consent judgment, the facts of each case must be examined to determine 
whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party” and “[a] plaintiff need not prevail on all issues if a 
significant one is resolved so [as] to achieve some of the benefit sought through the litigation”); 
Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202-03 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that based on the 
facts of the case, the plaintiffs may be prevailing parties for purposes of attorney’s fees awards if 
their suit was the catalyst that brought about compliance by the defendants despite the fact that 
judicial relief may no longer be necessary); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 
1981) (recognizing the legislative intent to award attorney’s fees even when no formal judicial relief 
was obtained and no final judicial determination was made on any Constitutional claim).  Plaintiffs 
are entitled to attorney’s fees in cases in which constitutional claims are mooted by defendant’s 
remedial action subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit, if the plaintiff’s lawsuit is a substantial factor 
or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendant to end their unconstitutional behavior.  Id.  
American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the 
efforts by the prevailing party must establish clear, causal relationship between the litigation sought 
and practical outcome realized as long as it is a material factor in bringing about the defendant’s 
action and as contributing in a significant way); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 
1982) (deciding one of the factors in determining an award of attorney fees was whether the lawsuit 
acted as a catalyst or was a material factor in the defendant’s decision to change the disputed 
practices and therefore provide, in substantial part, the relief sought); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 
1375, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that in order to be a prevailing party, a plaintiff must have 
achieved significant relief to which he was entitled under the civil rights laws through his success 
on the merits, favorable settlement, or voluntary actions by the defendants); Gerena-Valentin v. 
Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding attorney’s fees were available under the Voting 
Rights Act to the prevailing party if the plaintiff showed there was a causal connection between the 
relief obtained and the litigation in which fees were sought, and that a causal connection existed if 
the plaintiff’s lawsuit was a catalytic, necessary, or substantial factor in attaining the relief); 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding a 
court must decide whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and whether there was a causal 
connection between the litigation and the relief obtained from the defendant); J & J Anderson, Inc. 
v. Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that under § 1983, to prevail and receive 
attorney fees, the plaintiff must show that the lawsuit was a substantial factor or significant catalyst 
in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior, the plaintiff’s action was 
causally linked to the relief obtained, and the defendant’s conduct was in response to the lawsuit); 
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[w]hen a party’s success in 
achieving his goal results from a settlement, or some other event occurring before there has been a 
judicial ruling on the merits of the civil rights claims, it is necessary under the attorney’s fees 
provision of § 1988 to determine whether there were colorable civil rights claims involved in the 
case and whether they served as catalysts in securing the result”); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. 
Westerville City Sch., 985 F.2d 255, 258 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding the issue for the district court to 
address is whether plaintiffs have accomplished a “material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties”) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113). 
 64. For examples of the use of the catalyst theory, see supra note 63 and infra note 70. 
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decision rendered on rehearing, decided S-1 & S-2 by & through P-1 & 
P-2 v. State Board of Education,65 and held that the catalyst theory was 
no longer a viable legal basis for determining prevailing party status 
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar v. Hobby.66  The main 
problem with using Farrar to reject the catalyst theory was that the case 
involved no catalytic effect.67  The only question was whether an actual 
judgment awarding only nominal damages was sufficient to qualify the 
plaintiff as a prevailing party.68  Many scholars did not believe that the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision would have any effect on the Supreme Court’s 
view on the catalyst theory.69  Even after the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 65. 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).  In this case, the parents of handicapped students 
brought an action under § 1983 seeking tuition reimbursement and alleging that the defendants had 
violated the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400.  Id. at 50.  The district court 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and the defendants appealed.  Id.  While the appeal was 
pending, the plaintiff and one of the defendants reached a settlement.  Id.  The other defendants, the 
State Board and the chairman of the State Board, C.D. Spangler, Jr., were not parties to the 
settlement and the parents did not dismiss any of their claims against the state defendants.  Id.  On 
appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held for prudential reasons that the settlement 
mooted the appeal because it gave the plaintiffs the reimbursement they sought.  Id. at 50-51.  They 
remanded the case for a determination regarding attorney fees available to the plaintiffs.  S-1 & S-2, 
21 F.3d at 51.  After the decision by the court, the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services of the United States Department of Education informed the State that federal education 
funds would be withdrawn if the State did not amend its law to authorize hearing officers to decide 
parents’ reimbursement claims.  Id. at 51.  Three years after the plaintiff’s claims had been declared 
moot, the State responded and enacted legislation giving administrative law judges the authority to 
make binding decisions subject to appeal regarding a child’s special education needs.  Id. at 51.  
After the amendment, the district court considered the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees against 
the state defendants and assessed fees against the defendants.  Id.  On appeal, a panel of the court 
affirmed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees.  Id. (citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 6 
F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1993)).  The court then granted the state defendants’ petition for rehearing en 
banc.  Id.  On rehearing, the court held (1) a person may not be a prevailing party plaintiff except by 
virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the 
legal relief sought, and (2) the fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for post-litigation 
changes in a defendant’s conduct cannot suffice to establish plaintiff as a prevailing party and the 
catalyst theory is no longer available for that purpose.  S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51. 
 66. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in S-1 & 
S-2, cited Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, but did not point to any specific language for their basis in 
rejecting the catalyst theory.  21 F.3d at 51.  See further discussion supra note 58 and infra note 
115. 
 67. 506 U.S. 103 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 
194-95 (2000).  The Supreme Court noted that “Farrar, 506 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1992), 
acknowledged that a civil rights plaintiff awarded nominal damages may be a ‘prevailing party’ 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,” but the case involved no catalytic effect.  Id. at 194.  “It would be 
premature, however, for us to address the continuing validity of the catalyst theory in the context of 
this case.”  Id. at 195. 
 68. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 105 (holding that although the plaintiff was found to be a prevailing 
party, he was not entitled to attorney fees because only nominal damages were awarded). 
 69. E.g., Sisk, supra note 10, at 289. 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/5
STANLEY1.DOC 4/7/03  12:53 PM 
2003] BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME 379 
nine circuit courts reaffirmed their interpretation of prevailing party 
status under the catalyst theory.70 
                                                                                                                                 
Although the S-1 & S-2 en banc decision sets the stage for Supreme Court review of this 
issue, the Court is unlikely to discard the catalyst theory outright and require every 
lawsuit to be driven through a judgment before a checkered flag can be waved.  
Nevertheless, the S-1 & S-2 decision may have the salutary effect of prompting 
reconsideration of the parameters of the theory.  The Supreme Court may well 
emphasize that the theory may be applied only when the causal connection between the 
filing of the lawsuit and the change in conduct or policy is close and unattenuated.  In 
that way the Court may find a middle ground between allowing defendants to deprive 
plaintiffs of attorney fees by unilaterally mooting the underlying case by conceding to 
plaintiffs’ demands and discouraging public officials from policy initiatives for fear that 
worthwhile changes may be retroactively linked to a lawsuit and result in a hefty bill for 
attorneys’ fees. 
Id.  (citations omitted).  Contra Pacold, supra note 30, at 1013-14 (discussing that Farrar casts 
doubt on the theory and the theory might not last much longer); Laura E. Flenniken, Comment, No 
More Plain Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 477, 501 (1994) (arguing that Farrar’s 
description of prevailing party raises questions of the continuing vitality of the catalyst doctrine). 
 70. See, e.g., Paris v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 
1993).  “In general, the court looks for some ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties’ and this may occur through a bottom-line success in the litigation or acting as a catalyst in 
causing the desired alteration.”  Id. at 238.  The First Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Stanton v. 
Southern Berkshire Reg’l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d. 574, 576-78 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting “a plaintiff may 
achieve such ends through litigation, and deserve attorney’s fees, even without a formal victory; for 
example, the so-called ‘catalyst’ theory might justify an award where the defendant abandoned an 
unlawful practice after the case was brought, as a direct result of the lawsuit, but without the need 
for a decree” and the analysis is “whether [the lawsuit] was a catalyst for an outcome favorable to 
[the plaintiff]”).  Eight of the other circuit courts held the same way.  See Morris v. City of West 
Palm Beach, 194 F.3d. 1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the catalyst test remains available 
in this circuit); Payne v. Bd. of Ed., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that “where no direct 
relief is obtained and a plaintiff is claiming he or she ‘prevailed’ because the defendant made 
significant changes in its past practices, the plaintiff’s lawsuit must have been the ‘catalyst’ that 
caused the defendant to make the changes”); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“Farrar does not eviscerate the long-standing doctrine that a plaintiff who has obtained at least 
some part of what he sought in bringing the suit may be considered a prevailing party and may 
therefore seek an award of attorney fees,” and for the plaintiff to be considered a prevailing party, 
there must be a causal connection; that is, the suit must be a catalytic, necessary, or substantial 
factor in attaining relief.); Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(following and adopting the authority that Farrar did not preclude the catalyst test as an alternate 
theory for determining the prevailing party if no relief on the merits is obtained); Baumgartner v. 
Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 549 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that “given the importance that the 
catalyst theory long has had in prevailing party doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we would expect 
that if the Court intended to hold it no longer a viable theory it would address the issue head-on in a 
case which it was dispositive.  That was not so in Farrar.”); Zinn by Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 
F.3d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding the catalyst rule is the test in the circuit, the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit must be causally linked to the achievement of the relief obtained and the defendant must not 
have acted wholly gratuitously); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1, 17 
F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding “[w]here a defendant voluntarily complies with a plaintiff’s 
requested relief, thereby rendering the plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, the plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ 
under section 1988 if his suit is a catalyst for the defendant’s voluntary compliance and the 
defendant’s compliance was not gratuitous, meaning the plaintiff’s suit was neither ‘frivolous, 
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
Before 1997, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. 
(Buckhannon) operated care homes that provided assisted living to their 
residents.71  On January 4, 1996, Buckhannon applied to the Office of 
Health Facility Licensure and Certification (OHFLC) to renew their 
licensure,72 but Buckhannon failed an inspection by the West Virginia 
Office of the State Fire Marshal, because some of the residents, 
including 102 year old Dorsey Pierce,73 were incapable of “self-
preservation.”74  As a result, OHFLC issued to Buckhannon statements 
of deficiency, and then conducted a second inspection on September 3, 
1996.75  They found that Buckhannon was still in non-compliance with 
the fire safety requirements.76  On October 18, 1996, the West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources issued three orders 
commanding Buckhannon to cease-and-desist operations and requiring 
the closure of the resident care facilities within 30 days.77  This required 
                                                                                                                                 
unreasonable [n]or groundless’”); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding a 
plaintiff may prevail in the absence of a judicial determination on the merits under the continued use 
of the catalyst test to determine the prevailing party status for attorneys fees). 
 71. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 600 (2001).  W. VA. CODE § 16-5H-1, 16-5H-2 (1998) (encouraging the effective care 
and treatment of persons who are dependent on the services of others by reason of physical or 
mental impairment or who may require limited and intermittent nursing care, also defining a 
residential board and care home as any residence or place which advertised, offered, maintained or 
operated for the purposes as providing such services). 
 72. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 19 
F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (N.D. W. Va. 1998). 
 73. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 623 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Pierce, a party initially to the lawsuit, had resided 
at Buckhannon for some four years and her daughter lived nearby.  Id. 
 74. W. VA. CODE § 16-5H-1 (b) (WESTLAW through 1987) (defining self preservation as “a 
person that is, at least, capable of removing his or her physical self from situations involving 
imminent danger, such as fire”); W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 87-1-14.07 (1995) (repealed 1997) 
(including self-preservation as a requirement for residential board and care occupancies as: A 
person is capable of removing his or her physical self from situations involving imminent danger, 
such as fire); Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600 (noting that Buckhannon failed the inspection by the 
West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because several residents were incapable of self-
preservation).  Pierce and two other Buckhannon residents could not get to a fire exit without aid.  
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 75. Buckhannon, 19 F. Supp.2d at 570. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 600 (2001).  The West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshall gave the cease-and-
desist order to the care center for failing the inspection, because several of the residents were 
18
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the relocation of all the residents in the home.78 
On October 28, 1997, after receiving the cease-and-desist orders, 
Buckhannon, on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and 
residents (Petitioners), brought suit in the District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its 
agencies, and 18 individuals (Respondents).79  Petitioners sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the cease-and-desist 
orders, and the “self preservation” rule on which it rested, violated the 
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans 
With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).80  Respondents agreed to stay 
enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders pending resolution of the 
case and the parties began discovery.81  This allowed Ms. Pierce to 
continue living at the Buckhannon home until her death.82 
On January 2, 1998, Petitioners stipulated to a dismissal of their 
demands for damages after facing the Respondents’ sovereign immunity 
pleas.83  In February 1998, the district court faced a summary judgment 
motion by the Respondents, but the court found that Petitioners had 
presented discrimination claims under the FHAA and ADA.84 
In late February 1997, the State Fire Marshall and the Fire 
Commission began steps to repeal the self-preservation code.85  Their 
proposals to remove the self-preservation requirements were placed on 
file with the Secretary of State’s Office and the Legislative Rule-Making 
                                                                                                                                 
incapable of “self-preservation.”  Id. 
 78. Buckhannon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (noting that according to the law, the State Fire 
Marshall and the Office of Health Facility Licensure and Certification both found Buckhannon in 
non-compliance). 
 79. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at  600-01. 
 80. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT OF 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).  See supra note 4 for 
text of authorizing fee provision.  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
(1994).  See supra note 5 for text of authorizing fee provision.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600-01. 
  The family of Dorsey Pierce argued that forcing her to leave her home would be very 
traumatic.  Brief for Petitioner at *3, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of 
Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848) (recognizing that Ms. Pierce’s son-in-
law testified that he was happy with the care that his mother-in-law received at the facility). 
 81. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601. 
 82. Brief for Petitioner at *3 n.1, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848).  Ms. Pierce died on January 3, 
1999, at the age of 105.  Id.  She was dismissed as a party in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. 
West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 121 S.Ct. 510 (2000) (writ of cert dismissed). 
 83. Id. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 84. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 19 
F. Supp. 2d 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (holding the plaintiffs had stated claims for facial 
discrimination under the FHAA and discrimination under ADA). 
 85. Brief for Petitioner at *7-*8, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848). 
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Review Committee by August 1, 1997.86  In March, 1998, the West 
Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the “self-preservation” 
requirement under I 1998 W. Va. Acts 983-98687 and II 1998 W. Va. 
Acts 1198-1199,88 and Respondents moved to dismiss the case as 
moot.89  Petitioners alleged that their suit triggered the statutory appeal,90 
but the district court granted the Respondent’s motion and found that the 
1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions, and 
that there was no indication that the West Virginia legislature would 
repeal the amendments.91 
Petitioners requested attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” under 
FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)92 and ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205,93 
arguing that they were entitled to the fees under the catalyst theory.94  
                                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Brief for Petitioner at *7-*8, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848).  Administrative agencies like the 
Fire Commission do not have independent legal authority to make rules but they “may promulgate 
proposed rules.”  Id. at *8 n.3.  The Legislature may amend the rules but most of them are 
“approved with little discussion or amendment.”  Id.  See Joe Manchin III, WVSOS—Administrative 
Law—Detailed Step Procedures for Legislative Rule Making, (2002), available at 
http://www.wvsos.com/adlaw/rulemaking/stepprocedureslegislative.htm (last visited March 15, 
2002) (on file with author), for a step-by-step description of West Virginia’s procedure and the 12 
steps that constitute rule making procedures for legislative rules. 
 87. I 1998 W. Va. Acts 983-986 (amending regulations and removing self-preservation 
requirement). 
 88. II 1998 W. Va. Acts 1198-1199 (amending statute and removing self-preservation 
requirement). 
 89. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601. 
  E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (stating that “a case is moot when 
the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 
outcome”); Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (noting that “jurisdiction, 
properly acquired, may abate if the case becomes moot because (1) it can be said with assurance 
that ‘there is no reasonable expectation . . .’ that the alleged violation will recur . . . and (2) interim 
relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. 
When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither party has a 
legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.”).  
A case may become moot if the law underlying the dispute changes in a way that renders the 
plaintiff’s claim irrelevant or in a case for injunctive relief, when the condition challenged is of 
limited duration and ceases to exist at the time of final review.  Trotter, supra note 61, at 1450. 
 90. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Contra Brief for Respondent, 
Brief for Respondent at *4, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848) (arguing that “[t]here is no evidence in the 
record to support petitioners’ assertion that such changes were caused by the recognition that this 
lawsuit and persuasive expert discovery convinced the respondents that self preservation rules 
violated federal law.”). 
 91. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1994).  See supra note 4. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994).  See supra note 5. 
 94. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601; Brief for Petitioner at *9, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
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The district court denied the motion following the Fourth Circuit’s 
precedent, which required the denial of fees unless termination of the 
action accompanied a judgment, consent decree, or settlement.95  For the 
same reason, the court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.96  
The United States Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari on 
September 26, 2000.97 
B.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
1.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the ruling 
of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.98  The majority 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that the catalyst theory 
was not a permissible basis for awarding attorney’s fees under FHAA, 
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205.99  Given the 
“clear meaning of ‘prevailing party,’” a prevailing party is a party who 
has received at least some relief on the merits of his claim by a 
settlement enforced through a consent decree or a judgment on the 
merits.100  Specifically, “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, 
                                                                                                                                 
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (No. 99-1848) (noting 
the Petitioners moved for attorney fees because they had prevailed in their lawsuit and obtained the 
relief they sought in the eliminating of the self-preservation requirements).  Petitioners argued that 
through their lawsuit, they obtained all the relief that they sought because the Buckhannon home 
never closed and the residents were not forced to relocate.  Id. They further urged that there was a 
causal connection based on the chronology of events between the suit and Respondent’s acts to 
repeal the self-preservation requirements.  Id. 
 95. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 96. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., No. 
99-1424, 2000 WL 42250, at **1 (4th Cir. W.Va. Jan. 20, 2000) (stating that “[W]e are bound by 
our precedent . . . we affirm the judgment of the district court that relied on S-1 and S-2 in denying 
appellant’s motion for attorneys fees.”).  The court also noted that none of the defendants informed 
the plaintiff, the court, or even their own attorneys of the pending amendments.  Id. 
 97. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 530 
U.S. 1304 (2000) (granting writ of certiorari). 
 98. Id. at 610. 
 99. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610. 
 100. Id. at 607 (noting that “[i]n addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that 
settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees.”).  The majority looked to their cases in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), 
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989), Rhodes v. Stewart, 
488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam), Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987), Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 
122 (1980), and Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (per curiam), to point out that they had 
never awarded attorney fees except when plaintiff received a judgment on the merits or obtained a 
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although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by 
the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”101  A 
“judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties” is a 
prerequisite for an award of attorney fees.102  The legislative history of 
fee-shifting statutes is ambiguous to the availability of the catalyst 
theory and cannot override the clear meaning of ‘prevailing party.’103  
Because the meaning was clear, the majority did not look at the dissent’s 
policy arguments that a rejection of the catalyst theory would deter 
plaintiffs from bringing expensive but meritorious suits and that there 
would be disincentive for defendants to voluntarily change their 
conduct.104 
2.  Concurring Opinion 
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Justice Thomas, agreed with the majority opinion in its entirety but 
responded to the contentions of the dissent.105  Justice Scalia delved 
more deeply into the textual significance of the term ‘prevailing party’ 
and argued that the term was not something that had been newly 
“invented for use in late-20th century fee-shifting statutes.”106  Further, 
he declared that there was no authority to back up the definition 
supported by the dissent.107  Justice Scalia urged that the term 
                                                                                                                                 
court-ordered consent decree.  Id. at 1839-41.  They reiterated that neither “an interlocutory ruling 
that reverses a dismissal for failure to state a claim” nor a “reversal of a directed verdict for [the] 
defendant” was enough to make the plaintiff a prevailing party.  Id. at 1840.  “We cannot agree that 
the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes federal courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who, by 
simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit . . . has reached the 
sought-after destination without obtaining any judicial relief.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 101. Id. at 605. 
 102. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (holding that the catalyst theory allowed an award of fees 
when there was no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties). 
 103. Id. at 607-08 (concluding that the Senate and House Reports are insufficient to alter the 
“accepted meaning of the statutory term” because explicit statutory authority is needed to award 
fees in light of the American Rule that each party pays their own fees). 
 104. Id. at 608 (stating that “[w]e are skeptical of these assertions, which are speculative and 
unsupported by any empirical evidence.”). 
 105. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The concurrence strongly disagreed 
with the arguments and precedents set forth by the dissent.  Id. at 610-22. 
 106. Id. at 610-11.  J. Scalia stated that the term ‘prevailing party’ had been in the United 
States Statutes at Large since at least 1867 and was in the current United States Code at least 
seventy times.  Id. at 611.  See supra notes 29 and 33 for examples. 
 107. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the dissent did not cite 
a single case where the “prevailing party” was a “litigant who left the courthouse emptyhanded”). 
He also noted that at the time § 1988 was enacted there were no cases that used the catalyst theory 
as a basis for rewarding costs.  Id. at 611-12.  He also dismissed the dissent’s use of Baldwin v. 
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‘prevailing party’ was a legal term of art and it traditionally meant “the 
party that wins the suit or obtains a finding (or an admission) of 
liability.”108  He noted, “[w]ords that have acquired a specialized 
meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning”109 
and that the dissent distorted “the term ‘prevailing party’ beyond its 
normal meaning for policy reasons.”110  Concerned that the catalyst 
theory would reward attorney fees to the plaintiff extortionist,111 Justice 
Scalia could not support it because “one does not prevail in a suit that is 
never determined.”112 
Justice Scalia refused to bend to the dissent’s insistence that the 
catalyst theory had been accepted by a majority of the federal circuits, 
because he recognized that the Supreme Court’s opinions had 
contradicted unanimous decisions by the federal circuits in the past.113  
He reasoned that the precedent supported by the dissent was nothing 
more than decisions based on the Supreme Court’s own misleading dicta 
from the earlier Hewitt114 and Farrar115 decisions.116 
                                                                                                                                 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 144 A. 703 (1929), because an equity court could award costs as 
the equities demanded and that the other cases the dissent cited all resulted in the awarding of fees 
after a judicial finding, or its equivalent, based on the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  Id. at 612-13. 
 108. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing that there are other 
meanings of the word “prevailing” in other contexts but that when the word is used in a legal 
context, it is a term of art). 
 109. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that if Congress borrowed a word from the 
legal tradition, the word continued to hold the ideas that had attached to the word). 
 110. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia argued, “departure from normal 
usage . . . cannot be justified on the ground that it establishes a regime of logical even handedness.”  
Id. at 620.  “One does not prevail in a suit that is never determined.”  Id.  He contended that to 
stretch the holding in Maher to a suit where no judicial action had been taken was extending 
“prevailing party” past its normal meaning.  Id. at 618. 
 111. Buckhannon, 532 U.S at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
It could be argued, perhaps, that insofar as abstract justice is concerned, there is little to 
choose between the dissent’s outcome and the Court’s: If the former sometimes rewards 
the plaintiff with a phony claim (there is no way of knowing), the latter sometimes 
denies fees to the plaintiff with a solid case whose adversary slinks away on the eve of 
judgment.  But it seems to me the evil of the former far outweighs the evil of the latter.  
There is all the difference in the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon 
of attorney’s fees to some plaintiffs who are no less “deserving” of them than others who 
receive them, and a rule that causes the law to be the very instrument of wrong—
exacting the payment of attorney’s fees to the extortionist. 
Id. 
 112. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 620 (advocating that there must be a cutoff for the entitlement of 
fees and that the cutoff should be the failure to obtain a judgment in time). 
 113. Id. at 621 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), as an example where the 
Court decision contradicted every court that had considered the question). 
 114. 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987). 
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify a 
fee award under § 1988.  A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the 
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3.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, focused its argument in three ways: 
precedent, plain English, and tradition.117  First, it expressed disapproval 
of the Court’s requirement that a document be filed in court, and 
reasoned that the Court’s decision upset the long-standing circuit 
precedent of the application of the catalyst theory to federal fee-shifting 
statutes.118  Courts of appeals found it clear that a party prevailed for fee-
shifting purposes when “its ends are accomplished as a result of the 
litigation.”119  They noted, with the exception of the Fourth Circuit, none 
of the nine other courts of appeals that had addressed the catalyst issue 
had changed their interpretation of ‘prevail’ following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Farrar.120  The catalyst rule, therefore, deserved 
respect from the Supreme Court.121 
                                                                                                                                 
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a 
judgment—e.g., a monetary settlement or a change in conduct that redresses the 
plaintiff’s grievances.  When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed 
despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor. 
Id.  See also supra note 49 and accompanying text for further discussion of Hewitt. 
 115. 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). 
“[T]o be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988,” we held, “the 
plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute, which changes the legal 
relationship between itself and the defendant.”  We reemphasized that the “[t]ouchstone 
of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties.” 
Id.  The case also contained further dicta on which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied 
to strike down the catalyst theory: A person may not be a prevailing party plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or a settlement 
giving some of the legal relief sought in a § 1988 action.  S-1 & S-2 by & through P-1 & P-2 v. 
State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 
(1992)).  This exact language was not contained in Farrar, see supra notes 58 and 66. 
 116. Id. at 621-22 (noting that “[i]nforming the Courts of Appeals that our ill-considered dicta 
have misled them displays, it seems to me not ‘disrespect,’ but a most becoming (and well-
deserved) humility.”). 
 117. Id.  at 622-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 622-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  “The decision allows a defendant to escape a 
statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant 
to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the 
principal redress sought in the complaint.”  Id. at 622.  The dissent pointed to the numerous circuit 
courts that held the catalyst theory as a viable theory before and after the decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in S-1 & S-2.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625-628 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Associated Builders & Contractors of La. v. 
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 120. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Farrar involved 
no catalytic effect and any language that the Fourth Circuit relied on was merely dicta). 
 121. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See supra note 10 for the 
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The dissent believed that the meaning of ‘prevailing party’ adopted 
by the majority was too constrictive.122  They urged that the use of 
Black’s Law Dictionary was not definitive and that terms of art were to 
be determined contextually as well.123  Under the FHAA and ADA, they 
argued that Congress did not add “court ordered relief” to the standard 
for awarding fees, and by negative implication, did not foreclose the use 
of the catalyst theory.124 
They countered the concurring opinion’s argument of a lack of 
precedent by recognizing that several high state courts had regarded 
plaintiffs as prevailing when the defendant’s voluntary conduct mooted 
the suit but provided the plaintiffs with the relief they sought in their 
lawsuit.125  The dissenting opinion focused on the result of the lawsuit, 
which achieved the relief that Petitioners sought.126  The dissent urged 
that the proper construction of the modern civil rights fee-shifting 
statutes used words intended to hold their ordinary meanings.127 
The dissenting Justices advocated that the catalyst rule was adopted 
to “promote the vigorous enforcement” of the civil rights laws, but the 
Court’s holding cuts against this ideal because it denies access to the 
court for those “less well-heeled.”128  Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
                                                                                                                                 
elements of the catalyst theory as set forth by the dissent. 
 122. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that the fee-
shifting statutes do not have language that tightly bound fees to judgments as to exclude the 
application of the catalyst theory.  Id. at 629.  They analogized that there had been multiple 
instances where a defendant’s voluntary conduct, mooting the suit, provided relief that the plaintiffs 
sought and that similar federal practices had been observed in cases governed by the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d), the default rule allowing costs to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directed.  Id. at 631-33; 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2667 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that “[a]s provided in 
Rule 54(d), costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”). 
 123. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[o]ne can entirely 
agree with Black’s Law Dictionary that a party ‘in whose favor a judgment is rendered’ prevails, 
and at the same time resist, as most Courts of Appeals have, any implication that only such a party 
may prevail.”). 
 124. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 629-30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 125. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 629-30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the concurrence 
unconvincingly tries to distinguish these cases). 
 126. Id. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “In sum, plaintiffs were denied fees not because they 
failed to achieve the relief they sought.”  Id.  “On the contrary, they gained the very change they 
sought through their lawsuit when West Virginia repealed the self-preservation rule that would have 
stopped Buckhannon from caring for people like Dorsey Pierce.”  Id. 
 127. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 633-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (taking the position that a 
lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relief from an opponent and that a judicial decree is 
not the only way to prevail).  The dissent cited several examples of the common meanings for 
prevail.  Id. 
 128. Id. at 623, 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “Concomitantly, the Court’s constricted 
definition of ‘prevailing parties’ and consequent rejection of the ‘catalyst theory’ impede access to 
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Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976 in response to the Court’s holding in 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.129 It did so to “ensure that nonaffluent 
plaintiffs would have effective access to the Nation’s courts to enforce 
civil rights laws.”130 
The dissent addressed the majority’s policy arguments as 
unimpressive and argued that a defendant who knew that noncompliance 
would be expensive might be encouraged to conform his conduct to the 
legal requirements.131  The dissent also dismissed the concurrence’s 
opinion that saw the catalyst theory as encouraging the extortionist, 
because they felt Congress assigned to the courts the ability to recognize 
extortionists and, therefore, to exercise discretion in awarding attorney 
fees.132 
Finally, the dissent endorsed the adoption of the three-part catalyst 
theory test to determine the awarding of attorney fees, which was 
approved by the federal circuits.133  The majority opinion countered this 
argument by arguing that requests for attorney fees should not result in 
second litigations, and such a test was clearly not “readily 
administrable.”134 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Buckhannon decision added a roadblock for plaintiffs who 
attempt to bring lawsuits under fee-shifting statutes.135  This note 
                                                                                                                                 
court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of 
federal law by private attorneys general.”  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 
U.S. 240, 262 (1977) (holding that the “circumstances under which attorney’s fees are to be 
awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress 
to determine”).  See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case. 
 130. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910).  See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying 
text for further discussion of Congressional intent. 
 131. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 638-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alleging that the majority did 
not look beneath the surface of their policy arguments and instead focused on the meaning of 
prevailing). 
 132. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 640-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was normal for 
the judges in the cases to resolve fee disputes and determine at their discretion whether an award 
was in order and the amount that was due). 
 133. Id. at 627-28.  See supra note 10 (outlining the catalyst theory). 
 134. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610; Trotter, supra note 61, at 1440 (stating that the catalyst 
theory likely “generates more superfluous litigation than it avoids, considering the vast amounts of 
secondary litigation that have resulted from the inherently vague standards” used for recovering 
attorney fees). 
 135. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600-04 (holding a judgment on the merits or a consent decree 
“create[s] the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award 
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considers the impact of the bright-line rule for determining ‘prevailing 
party’ status on the parties in fee-shifting litigation136 and the Court’s 
holding, which contradicts the intent of Congress.137  It examines how 
the courts are facing the challenges related to ‘prevailing party’ status 
and the effects on litigants in different types of fee-shifting statutes.  
This note further considers the possible continued viability of the 
catalyst theory under certain circumstances138 and recommends that 
Congress respond to the Buckhannon decision.139 
A.  Determining the Clear Meaning of Prevailing Party 
The Supreme Court decided that the definition of ‘prevailing party’ 
was clear.140  Both the majority and the concurring opinions endorsed 
the use of Black’s Law Dictionary in defining ‘prevailing party.’141  
Justice Scalia, in the concurrence, advocated the use of Black’s Law 
Dictionary for terms that were “tailored to judicial settings” including 
‘prevailing party.’142  This approach to the interpretation of legal terms 
                                                                                                                                 
of attorney’s fees” (citations omitted)); Id. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that a person 
with limited resources could count on a judge to award them attorney fees when fees were 
warranted and still accept relief offered voluntarily by the defendant). 
  In fact, because of the litigation, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would not collect $200,000 that 
was owed from the plaintiffs for legal services rendered.  Marcia Coyle, Fee Change is a Sea-
change But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices’ Limit on Catalyst Theory Fees, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 
2001, at A1, available at WESTLAW, 6/11/01 NLJ A1, (Col. 5).  Plaintiffs’ counsel fully expected 
to win on the merits of the case so attorney fees were not seen as a compelling issue.  Id.  The state 
acknowledged that it would never settle the case, and unfortunately for the plaintiffs, six weeks 
later, the legislators repealed the law instead.  Id. 
 136. See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra notes 154-79 and accompanying text. 
 138. See infra notes 180-227 and accompanying text. 
 139. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
 140. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (noting “[g]iv[en] the clear meaning of ‘prevailing party’”).  
Contra Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating “[t]he Court today detects a 
‘clear meaning’ of the term prevailing party . . . that has heretofore eluded the large majority of the 
courts construing those words.”); Martin A. Schwartz, Attorney’s Fees Recovery Restricted in Civil 
Rights Cases, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 2001, at 3, available at WESTLAW, 8/21/2001 NYLJ 3, (col. 1) 
(arguing that the meaning cannot be clear when four Supreme Court Justices and eleven circuit 
courts reached the opposite result). 
 141. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary to define legal terms of art 
such as prevailing party); Id. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing prevailing party as a 
term of art and Black’s Law Dictionary was a part of the body of learning that accorded the term its 
legal meaning). 
 142. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that words that have 
acquired legal meaning should be defined based on the “body of learning” from which the term was 
borrowed and the term continued to hold the cluster of ideas that had attached to it over the 
centuries of practice); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains A 
Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 51, 55 (2001) (arguing “Given Buckhannon . . . Black’s Law 
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was consistent with the Court’s current trend of relying on legal 
dictionaries to define legal terms.143  When arguing before the Court 
about the definition of a term, a lawyer would be well advised to cite a 
dictionary as an authority for the definition of that term, because the 
Court has relied on a dictionary in nearly half of all the opinions in the 
Supreme Court’s two-centuries of existence.144 
In deciding the bright-line merit rule,145 the Supreme Court drew a 
distinction “between judicial relief and any other type of relief.”146  The 
focus in awarding attorney fees has shifted from the relief sought by the 
                                                                                                                                 
Dictionary may be the presumptive dictionary used by Justices Scalia and Thomas, at least for 
words and phrases ‘tailored to judicial settings.’”).  See supra note 2 for the definition of ‘prevailing 
party’ found in Black’s Law Dictionary. 
 143. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 142, at 51-52 (declaring that since the 1997-1998 
Term, the Court used dictionaries to define 28 words in 23 opinions and from 1990 through the 
1997-1998 Term the Court relied on dictionaries in almost 180 opinions to define more than 220 
terms). 
 144. Id. at 52 (providing a summary of the number of times the Supreme Court and each 
individual Justice have relied on a dictionary and which dictionaries each of the current Justices 
prefer).  For instance, Justice Scalia cited a dictionary on average in 4.17 opinions per year to define 
5.42 terms while Justice Thomas cited a dictionary in 3.57 opinions per year to define 4.14 terms 
from 1990 to 1998.  Id. at 52.  Their use of dictionaries increased in 1998-2001 to 4.0 opinions for 
4.33 terms and 3.66 opinions for 4.0 terms, respectively.  Id.  For an extensive survey of the use of 
dictionaries in Supreme Court opinions and court opinions generally, see Samuel A. Thumma & 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s 
Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999). 
 145. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 
(1991).  She defines as: 
Rules. – A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a 
determinate way to the presence of delimited facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and 
subjective value choices to be worked out somewhere else.  A rule captures the 
background principle or policy in a form that from then on operates independently.  A 
rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so 
produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness.  But the rule’s force as a rule is that 
decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the background principle or 
policy to the facts would produce a different result. 
Id. at 58.  See generally Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
Supreme Court made a bright line rule that a plaintiff would not qualify as a prevailing party for 
instances where a political branch in the state was motivated to enact legislation solely due to the 
suit, because it lacked the “necessary judicial imprimatur”) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 
121 S. Ct. 1840).  Contra Trotter, supra note 61, at 1439 (arguing that “Deciding the merits seems 
superfluous once a defendant effectively concedes that its conduct was illegal by voluntarily 
changing its behavior.”). 
 146. Adam Babich, Fee Shifting After Buckhannon, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10137, Jan., 2002, 
available at Westlaw, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10137 (noting that after the Buckhannon decision, attorney 
fees are precluded when there is “nonjudicial alteration of actual circumstances”); 4 RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 
19.36 (3d ed Supp. 2002) available at WESTLAW, CONLAW S 19.36 (stating that now the 
“general rule is that there must be a judicially-sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the 
parties in order for a court to approve an award of attorney’s fees”). 
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plaintiff to the court’s role in the securing the relief.147  By transforming 
the case-by-case determinations into a set of rigid formalities, the district 
court judges lost their use of discretion in awarding fees to prevailing 
parties.148  Rules like this cast doubt on the district court’s fact-finding 
abilities because they leave little room for discretion.149 
Even though the majority endorsed the term ‘prevailing party’ as 
having a clear meaning, the extent of judicial involvement necessary to 
prevail remains cloudy.150  A court-approved settlement is now enough 
to prevail even though such a settlement may have no admission of 
liability.151  Further, it places the trigger of the fee awarding rule in the 
hands of the parties, primarily the defendants, whose aims are “contrary 
to the interests of those Congress sought to protect.”152  This is troubling 
because the defendant can now deprive the plaintiff of attorney fees 
through their voluntary cessation of an illegal act before enough judicial 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 147. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (classifying such event as “a court 
entry memorializing her victory”). 
 148. The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (2001) 
[Leading Cases] (arguing that the fee-shifting scheme should be fact-intensive and standard-based 
to evaluate the plaintiff’s possible success and protect the plaintiff from manipulation by the 
defendant).  By substituting a formalistic rule instead of equitable discretion, the decision threatens 
to weaken civil rights enforcement because judges can no longer use discretion in what fee awards 
would be fair.  Id. at 463-64.  “Not only can a careful judicial eye squelch defendant gaming, but 
with the particulars of cases at their disposal, district court judges are simply better equipped to 
advance congressional goals when determining whether a party has prevailed” Id. at 466.  A bright 
line rule will continue to lead to arbitrary results.  Id. at 464.  See also, Sullivan, supra note 145, at 
62 (acknowledging that the argument that rules are fairer is based in the requirement that judges 
must act consistently therefore reducing the danger of arbitrariness or bias while the 
counterargument is that rules cause decisions to be arbitrary because judges are forced to treat cases 
that are substantively alike differently in view of underlying principles). 
 149. Sullivan, supra note 145, at 64 (noting that “Rules embody a distrust for the 
decisionmaker they seek to constrain.”). 
 150. Babich, supra note 146 (analyzing that a consent decree may be enough to prevail as 
should a voluntary remand, while an out-of-court settlement would probably not be enough to 
prevail).  “In sum, whenever a Court issues an order that affords significant relief to a plaintiff, the 
plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ regardless of whether the opposing party resists, defaults, settles, or 
unilaterally surrenders.”  Id.  See infra notes 160-227 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of the courts’ responses to the Buckhannon ruling. 
 151. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court’s decision 
really has no merit requirement, as a court-approved settlement is enough to receive fees although it 
may lack an admission of liability).  Contra Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (holding “settlement 
agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s 
fees” because it is a court-ordered ‘“chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and 
the defendant’” even if it does not “include an admission of liability” (citations omitted)). 
 152. Leading Cases, supra note 148, at 465 (arguing that the stronger the plaintiff’s case 
becomes, the more the defendant can benefit by avoiding a judgment, consent decree or a court-
approved settlement). 
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involvement occurs and therefore, the initial illegal action will go 
unchecked by the judicial system.153 
B.  Contrary to Legislative Intent 
Due to the five-to-four decision,154 the argument that the Court’s 
decision was contrary to Congress’s intent remains alive.155  In the 
Senate Report No. 94-1101, Congress expressly declared that the 
purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 was to 
“give[] the federal courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing parties in suits brought to enforce the civil rights acts which 
Congress ha[d] passed since 1866.”156  They premised fee-shifting 
statutes on the appreciation that a plaintiff brings an action not for 
himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general’ in vindicating a 
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority, and that has left 
much of the policing powers to private individuals.157  Under the civil 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Barton Aronson, How a Recent Supreme Court Attorneys’ Fees Decision Will 
Dramatically Change the Enforcement of Civil Rights and Other Laws, FindLaws Legal 
Commentaries, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ aronson/20010629.html (Jun. 29, 2001) (discussing 
that “the ability of the defendant to deprive a plaintiff of a hard-earned fee is now beyond the reach 
of the courts” because the defendant can voluntarily moot the lawsuit, and without a judgment or a 
settlement and get away without paying the plaintiff’s attorney fees). 
 154. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598. 
 155. Id. at 636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (declaring that “Congress enacted § 1988 to ensure 
that nonaffluent plaintiffs would have ‘effective access’ to the Nation’s courts to enforce civil rights 
laws” (citations omitted)).  The Senate Report on the 1976 Civil Right’s Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act states: “[F]or purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have 
prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining 
relief.”  S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912, cited in 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 156. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5908-09 
(declaring that the law was meant to remedy gaps in the civil rights laws created by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). 
 157. Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. 
L. REV. 281, 306 (1977) (discussing that Congress made fee-shifting statutes “premised upon the 
proposition that private enforcement is essential to the effectuation of the substantive statutory 
scheme and that the award of attorney’s fees is essential to effective private enforcement”); Daniel 
L. Lowery, “Prevailing Party” Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-shifting’s Shifting Threshold, 
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1446 (1993) (stating that the main goal of the Fees Act was to enable 
citizens to bring civil rights claims and encourage attorneys to accept civil rights cases); Sisk, supra 
note 10, at 279 (noting that “[a] primary purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act is to encourage 
private parties to initiate litigation to challenge unreasonable government rules and policies and, 
thereby, to directly influence the policy deliberations of administrative agencies.”); Sternlight, supra 
note 38, at 577 (asserting that “[r]egardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful 
civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or 
relatively small damages awards.”); Bob Van Voris, South Florida’s ADA Industry Lawyer, 
Partners File 740 Suits on Behalf of Disabled, NAT’L L.J., July 16, 2001, at A1 (recognizing the 
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rights laws, Congress recognized that attorney fees are available for 
judgments short of determinations on the merits because many plaintiffs 
have little or no money to hire a lawyer to defend their rights and could 
not bring their claims otherwise.158  The Court’s interpretation of 
‘prevailing party’ does not follow Congress’ intent when it now requires 
a consent decree or a judgment on the merits.159 
C.  Impact on Civil Rights Litigation 
1.  Immediate Results and Predicted Changes in Strategies 
Immediately following the Buckhannon ruling, some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers offered to settle their cases at a discount.160  Defendants ordered 
to pay attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory appealed if they could, 
                                                                                                                                 
need for the private litigant to enforce the ADA and noting that the policing of small businesses was 
left to the private individual). 
 158. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910 (noting 
“[i]f private citizens are able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s 
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to 
recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court”).  “Moreover, for purposes of the award 
of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a 
consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief (citing Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 
1005 (2d Cir. 1975).”  S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 
5912.  See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, 
Capture and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 165 (2002) (arguing that a “a fee award is 
appropriate if the citizen plaintiff has materially advanced the goals of the statute, even without a 
favorable judgment”). 
 159. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913.  The 
Senate Report on the  Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 states: 
This bill . . . provides the fee awards which are necessary if citizens are able to 
effectively secure compliance with these existing statutes.  There are very few provisions 
in our Federal laws which are self-executing.  Enforcement of the laws depends on 
governmental action and . . . on private actions through the courts.  If the cost of private 
enforcement actions becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement.  If our civil 
rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen 
cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in 
these cases. 
Id.; Shub, supra note 6, at 706 (hypothesizing that “Joe cannot afford to pay for legal services; yet 
an attorney is willing to take Joe’s case because of the award of attorney’s fees he knows will be 
forthcoming if Joe’s suit is successful”).  By denying fees to Joe’s lawyer, “[a]ttorneys w[ill] 
become increasingly hesitant to take on clients like Joe.”  Id. at 725.  “Despite these clients’ 
legitimate claims of having suffered violations of their civil rights, the likelihood that either the 
client would not be able to pay or that the court would not award attorney’s fees would result in 
these clients’ inability to obtain legal representation in these important cases.”  Id. 
 160. Van Voris, supra note 157 (noting that Buckhannon had this effect on public litigation 
claims). 
31
Stanley: Buckhannon Board and Care Home
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
STANLEY1.DOC 4/7/03  12:53 PM 
394 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol 36:363 
and plaintiffs found their fee awards reversed.161  Requests by plaintiffs 
for attorney fees based on the catalyst theory were vacated or denied.162 
The ruling was a big win for businesses and the government 
because they no longer had to be concerned with as many plaintiffs 
bringing civil rights lawsuits and the ruling also limited their liability as 
to plaintiff attorney fees.163  Further, the ruling may also reduce the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 161. E.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 273 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(reversing the district court’s award of attorney fees based on the catalyst theory, because after 
Buckhannon, the catalyst theory was no longer viable in determining a prevailing party); New York 
State Fed’n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 272 F.3d 154 
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the catalyst theory was no longer a permissible basis for awarding 
attorney fees under § 1988 and because the lawsuit did not result in a judicially sanctioned change 
in the legal relationships, the award of attorney fees was reversed); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 
493 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing the award of attorney fees based only on the catalyst theory because 
of the rejection of the catalyst theory in Buckhannon); Sacco v. Dep’t of Justice, No. DC-0752-99-
0219-A-1, 90 M.S.P.R. 37, 41-42 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 4, 2001) (holding the catalyst theory was not a 
permissible basis for the award of attorney fees by the Board); Auguste v. Hammons, 727 N.Y.S. 2d 
880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1 Dept. July 26, 2001) (holding the catalyst theory of recovery as being 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon and reversing the award of attorney fees). 
 162. E.g., Ken-N.K., Inc. v. Vernon Twp., No. 98-1871, 2001 WL 1006265, at **8 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 23, 2001) (holding that because the plaintiffs did not obtain a judgment on the merits or a 
consent decree and the catalyst theory was no longer allowed, they were not prevailing parties and 
accordingly, attorney fees were denied); Reimer v. Champion Healthcare Corp., 258 F.3d 720 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (vacating attorney fees awarded under the catalyst theory); J.S. v. Rampo Central Sch. 
Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 at 570, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Buckhannon should be 
applied retroactively because the Court did not overrule clear past precedent nor did it establish a 
new principle of law and therefore attorney fees based on the catalyst theory are denied); Sileikis v. 
Perryman, No. 01 C 944, 2001 WL 965503, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 21, 2001) (holding that the plaintiff 
can no longer rely on the catalyst theory to receive an award of attorney fees and that the plaintiff’s 
request for attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory is denied); Sumner v. Principi, 1st Vet. App. 
256 at 256 at *1 (Vet. App. Nov. 6, 2001) (holding that the catalyst theory was no longer viable, and 
because the remand did not recognize an administrative error, the appellant was not a prevailing 
party); Vaughn v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 277 at 278 at *2 (Vet. App. Nov. 9, 2001) (holding the 
catalyst theory was no longer available to achieve prevailing party status and as such the plaintiff 
cannot recover fees); Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 204 (Vet. App. Sept. 4, 2001) (holding that 
the catalyst theory is no longer available to achieve prevailing party status under the EAJA). 
 163. Jack Hayes, U.S. Supreme Court Denies ADA Legal Fees, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS, 
June 25, 2001, at 1 (declaring the ruling offered encouragement to restaurant owners who had been 
plagued by an epidemic of ADA lawsuits).  The restaurant owners hoped that Buckhannon would 
stop the tide of opportunistic lawyers who on a contingent fee basis brought suits for minor 
violations and tried to speed up compliance through the threat of large attorney fee bills.  Id.  See 
Tony Mauro, Relief Must Be Awarded by Court, Not Volunteered by Defendants, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 
2001, at 1, available at Westlaw, 5/30/2001 N.Y.L.J. 1, (col. 3) (noting that it was a win for the 
business community from General Motors to the Girl Scouts).  ‘“The extortion by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who seek fees without winning the very case they started is over,’” said Charles Newman 
of the St. Louis office of Bryan Cave, who wrote a brief for the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers arguing that the catalyst theory had enabled plaintiffs’ lawyers to link fee requests to 
actions by car companies such as voluntary recalls.”  Id.  See also, Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt 
Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-related cases on its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 
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number of frivolous claims brought by civil rights plaintiffs.164  Less 
restrictive ways are available to address that problem because defendants 
could easily respond with a Rule 11 motion for sanctions165 or request 
their own attorney fees under the bad faith doctrine.166 
On the other hand, defendants who are violating a civil rights law 
have an incentive to string out the litigation, and when a plaintiff appears 
likely to prevail just before trial, the defendant can unilaterally change 
their policies and moot the lawsuit to avoid the fee award.167  Defense 
attorneys contend that is an unrealistic result because no defendant 
would want to expend the money or time to drop the case just before 
trial in order to be relieved of the possible obligation to pay the 
plaintiff’s attorney fees.168 
                                                                                                                                 
TULSA L. REV. 305, 326 (noting the decision could be considered a win for the business 
community); Zinn, supra note 158, at 132 (opining that “the citizen suit is a blunt instrument [and] 
[u]nfettered citizen enforcement would not create an optimal mix of cooperative and adversarial 
enforcement because citizen plaintiffs will not always distinguish between productive and excessive 
cooperation.”); Juan Otero, Supreme Court Ruling Limits Cost Shifting Attorneys’ Fees for Plaintiff, 
NATION’S CITIES WEEKLY, June 4, 2001, at WESTLAW (recognizing that this result was a victory 
for cities and towns because the catalyst theory opened up the municipalities for extortive strike 
suits to obtain attorney fees without regard to the “existence or non-existence of litigation on the 
issue in question”). 
 164. Matthew D. Slater, Comment, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards in Moot Cases, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 819, 823 (1982).  The problem arises that a potential plaintiff could bring an 
illegitimate civil rights claim hoping that the defendant will decide to appease the plaintiff and pay 
the attorney fees instead of undertaking extended litigation and still having to pay his own lawyer.  
Id. at 824. 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  Rule 11 authorizes that: 
By presenting to the court . . . an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, - 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument. . . ; 
Id.  The court may also authorize sanctions against the lawyers, law firms or parties for violations of 
Rule 11.  Id.; Klausner, supra note 22, at 301 (arguing that such a ruling requires attorney to 
“refrain from litigating for improper purposes, to exhibit candor toward the court, and to perform a 
reasonable investigation of the law and facts with respect to all papers submitted to the court”). 
 166. See supra note 25 for further discussion of the bad faith doctrine. 
 167. Coyle, supra note 135 (predicting that defendants may act in this unilateral manner to foil 
plaintiffs); The People Lose, NEWS & OBSERVER (RALEIGH, N.C.), June 1, 2001, at A20, available 
at 2001 WL 3467550 (allowing defendants with weak claims to get out-of-court settlements or 
change their behavior right before going to trial and thus avoid the adverse judgment and the award 
against them for attorney fees); Mauro, supra note 163, at 1 (noting that “[t]his gives defendants a 
strong incentive to string out litigation as long as possible and then, on the eve of trial, unilaterally 
fix the situation and stick their tongues out at the plaintiffs.”). 
 168. See Coyle, supra note 135 (arguing that manipulation by the private or government 
defendant is unlikely because it would result in an extreme waste of resources). 
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Plaintiffs that bring a claim now have several courses of action 
including insisting on a consent decree accompanying a settlement, 
litigating to try to stop the court from finding that their case is moot, and 
bringing actions for damages where they would have originally sought 
only injunctive relief.169  Resources will be spent on additional hearings 
over settlements, consent decrees, dismissals, and other collateral issues 
involving attorney fees and, therefore, eliminate anything saved by the 
rejection of the catalyst theory and its hearings.170 
Potential plaintiffs are now in a position where they may decide not 
to bring a claim because they cannot afford it.171  Those particularly 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See also, Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Constitutional Litigation, in SECTION 1983 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2001, at 73 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 
H0-00D7, 2001), available at Westlaw, 667 PLI/LIT 37.  He suggests that the possible strategies for 
a plaintiff are now: 
1.  inclusion of a claim for monetary relief with the prayer for injunctive relief; 
2.  seek relief on behalf of a class of persons pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23; 
3.  during settlement negotiations insist that any settlement agreement be embodied in a 
consent decree; 
4.  argue vigorously against dismissal of the action on mootness grounds; and 
5.  lobby Congress for legislative change to overturn Buckhannon. 
Id.  See also, Coyle, supra note 135 (predicting the behavior of plaintiffs as seeking damage claims 
in addition to injunctive relief); Leading Cases, supra note 148, at 465 (stating that “Fear of being 
denied fees will induce plaintiffs, if they choose to file at all, to expend time and resources to 
sidestep a finding of mootness even if the defendant voluntarily complies”); Richard A. Rothschild, 
Events Leading Up to the Fee Litigation: What You Need to Think About Even If You are Not Going 
to Be the One to Write the Fee Motion, in LITIGATING SECTION 1988 ATTORNEYS’ FEES 2001, at 
*10 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H0-00ER, 2001), available at 
Westlaw, 666 PLI/LIT 7 (arguing that plaintiffs should “[i]nsist on stipulated judgment or consent 
decree rather than out-of-court settlement” and “[s]ettle fees and merits together” as well as “[i]n 
appropriate cases call defendants’ bluff and litigate to judgment”); Candice Sang-Jasey & Linda D. 
Headley, Attorneys’ Fees and Damages in Special Education Cases, N.J. LAWYER: THE 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2001, at *39, available at WESTLAW, 212-Dec N.J. Law. 38 (advising that under 
IDEA, parents should either secure an agreement on fees as part of a settlement, insist that 
settlements be placed on the record and incorporated in a decision and order at the due process 
level, or in an order or judgment at the appellate level).  E.g., Gottfried v. Medical Planning Serv., 
Inc., 280 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that even though a claim for injunctive 
relief is moot, relief in the form of damages for a past constitutional violation is not moot). 
 170. Leading Cases, supra note 148, at 466-67 (arguing that resources will now be spent on 
dismissal motions instead of the catalyst theory); Coyle, supra note 135 (predicting its impact will 
depend on the extent to which defendants change their conduct); Thomas Scarlett, Supreme Court 
Limits Reimbursement of Attorney Fees under Federal Statutes, TRIAL, Aug. 2001, at *17, available 
at Westlaw, 37-AUG Trial 16 (recognizing that the decision will keep people with valid claims 
from going to court and may force some claims through longer litigation rather than allowing for 
informal settlement). 
 171. The People Lose, supra note 167 (arguing that the people most hurt by the Buckhannon 
decision are the “people of modest means”)  See Sternlight, supra note 38, at 582 (noting the 
Supreme Court’s decisions have practically guaranteed that a civil rights plaintiff’s attorney will end 
up “in the red.”).  “[P]laintiffs’ attorneys are . . . economically forced to abandon civil rights 
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harmed are plaintiffs enforcing several environmental fee-shifting 
statutes172 where damages are not recoverable and only injunctive relief 
is available.173  While public interest groups acknowledge that attorney 
fees are helpful, they have other sources of income.174  Nonetheless, the 
average citizen will be discouraged from filing a lawsuit and will likely 
have difficulty finding a lawyer,175 because there will be a decrease in 
the amount of litigation that public interest attorneys will be able to 
undertake and still remain solvent.176 
                                                                                                                                 
litigation, leaving plaintiffs with no adequate representation.”  Id. 
 172. Russell & Gregory, supra note 39, at 308 (suggesting that Congress “empowered private 
citizens to institute suits to enforce environmental regulations and compel regulatory agencies to 
enforce such regulations”).  See Coyle, supra note 135 (noting that the Clean Water Act, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act are affected by the Buckhannon ruling); Babich, supra note 146 
(noting several fee-shifting environmental statutes that used the term prevailing party in their text as 
RCRA § 7002(e), Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act § 326(f), 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 310(f), CWA §§ 
505(d) and 505(b)(3), Oil Pollution Act § 1006(g), Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act § 215 and 
Equal Access to Justice Act). 
 173. Mauro, supra note 163 (recognizing that the ruling in Buckhannon will be devastating to 
environmental cases where the only relief is injunctive); Aronson, supra note 153 (noting that most 
of the statutes involve only injunctive relief and compensatory damages may be unavailable under 
most environmental laws). 
 174. Aronson, supra note 153 (predicting that it is a “blow to national civil rights 
organizations” but that there are still other sources of income for them unlike the “other people out 
there”).  See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public 
Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (1984) (discussing that public interest 
litigants are funded through a variety of sources and attorney fees are only a modest source of 
funding for those public interest organizations). 
 175. Percival & Miller, supra note 174, at 237-38 (arguing that the prospective benefit to an 
individual public interest litigant will generally not be sufficient to make it worthwhile to bring a 
civil rights claim); The People Lose, supra note 167 (arguing Buckhannon will likely result in fewer 
attorneys being willing to gamble their time and money on public interest litigation); Mauro, supra 
note 163 (acknowledging that ‘“there will be a strong disincentive for lawyers to take on cases for 
people who can’t afford to pay’”); Aronson, supra note 153 (noting that attorneys were reporting 
less activity on cases for federal remedial statutes). 
 176. Coyle, supra note 135 (arguing that the Buckhannon decision will reduce the amount of 
lawsuits that public interest lawyers will be able to undertake); Sternlight, supra note 38, at 577, 598 
(discussing that the Supreme Court’s rulings have caused civil rights attorneys to have to structure 
their practices in such a manner as to keep themselves from meeting financial disaster which makes 
it more difficult for a plaintiff to secure representation).  The Supreme Court’s rulings have made it 
very difficult for attorneys to specialize in “plaintiffs’-side civil rights law.”  Id. at 599. 
  See Berger, supra note 157, at 311.  Though some courts have said “[a] member of the 
legal profession has the obligation to represent clients who are unable to pay for counsel and also 
bring suits in the public interest.  While embarking upon their duties, they should not be motivated 
by a desire for profit but by public spirit and sense of duty.”  Id.  Public interest lawyers are still few 
and far between.  Id. at 313. 
  Many cases could be handled through pro bono representation, but Rule 6.1 of The Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct states only that “[a] lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours 
35
Stanley: Buckhannon Board and Care Home
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
STANLEY1.DOC 4/7/03  12:53 PM 
398 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol 36:363 
2.  Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Concerns 
Attorneys in civil rights actions have considerable concern over 
their ability to receive payment for their legal services.177  Cases under 
fee-shifting statutes could lead to conflicts of interest between the client 
and the lawyer on what is in the best interest of the client, particularly in 
regard to availability of fees.178  An attorney will have to be creative in 
the settlement negotiations to zealously represent the client, and at the 
same time, protect herself.179  Plaintiffs will likely refuse to agree to 
settlements that do not result in the judicial imprimatur or the needed 
                                                                                                                                 
of pro bono publico legal services per year.”  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 6.1 
(1983).  There is an overwhelming need for this representation, but many lawyers do not do pro 
bono work on a monthly basis.  Timothy Day, Opening Doors to Justice: Unfinished Business, 
WYO. LAW., Dec. 2001, at *4, available at Westlaw, 24-DEC Wyo. Law. 4.  Tennessee lawyers 
cited several excuses for not taking pro bono work including they were too busy, they were 
financially constrained, and they were too inexperienced in poverty law areas.  Susan C. Robertson 
& Elizabeth W. Sims, Tennessee Lawyers, Who Are You?, TENN. BAR JOURNAL, Feb. 2002, at *27, 
available at WESTLAW, 38-FEB Tenn. B.J. 22. 
 177. Sternlight, supra note 38, at 592. 
Generally, the biggest concerns of these attorneys are the following: (1) they may be 
forced into settlement which requires them to forego their entire fee; (2) they may be 
awarded fees, in a settlement or court award, which do not reflect their hourly rate; (3) 
they may be awarded fees, in a settlement or court award, which do not reflect all of the 
hours expended on the litigation; (4) they may be denied adequate compensation for the 
delay in payment or risk of non-payment they have endured; and (5) they may be forced 
to absorb the cost of expert witnesses. 
Id. 
 178. Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of 
Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 309-10 (1984) (noting that in fee-
shifting statutes, the lawyer’s conduct in representation of a client may be influenced by 
impermissible conflicts of interest that led the lawyer to take steps other than in the best interest of 
the client); The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state: “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client may be materially limited by . . . the lawyer’s own interests.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b) (1983).  The Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility states: “[a] lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional 
judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, 
business, property, or personal interests.”  MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
101 (1981). 
 179. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) (declaring that “A 
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law”); Mauro, supra note 
163 (mentioning that an attorney should work for a settlement for the client and then worry about 
the attorney fees, but if the settlement is insufficient to show that the plaintiff prevailed, attorneys 
will be forced to negotiate for the attorney fees at the same time as the settlement, which could give 
rise to a conflict); Sternlight, supra note 38, at 592.  In order to protect herself, the attorney should 
use a fee agreement.  Id.  Attorneys could limit their practice to clients who can afford to pay full 
hourly rates on a regular billing basis.  Id. at 593.  A partially contingent fee agreement could be 
used.  Id. at 594.  An attorney needs to keep ‘complete and detailed records’ of the work performed 
on the case.  Id. at 595. 
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attorney fees.180  The main impact will be to develop complex settlement 
agreements and to impose extra litigation fees that do not benefit either 
the plaintiff or the defendant.181 
D.  Sufficiency of Settlement and Other Judicial Proceedings 
Most courts now face the challenge of determining whether the 
settlement agreement is more like a consent decree or a private 
settlement and whether the agreement had enough judicial 
involvement.182  Several courts have determined that without a court 
order, the settlement agreement is merely a private settlement,183 but 
generally, when some type of court order is present, the plaintiff 
prevails.184  Furthermore, a partial consent decree was sufficient to 
prevail,185 but a partial settlement was not.186  The District Court for the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 180. Babich, supra note 146 (discussing ways that the plaintiff can respond to the Buckhannon 
ruling); Aronson, supra note 153 (arguing that a plaintiff must continue to fight on in order to 
secure attorney’s fees which is counterproductive). 
 181. Babich, supra note 146 (arguing that by complicating settlements, it will increase the 
litigation costs to both parties). 
 182. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, n.7 (stating that “[p]rivate settlements do not entail the 
judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees”).  Compare Luis R. v. Joliet Township 
High Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4798, 2002 WL 54544, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002) (holding the 
mediation agreement between the parties was nothing more than a private settlement and that 
private settlement agreements do not confer prevailing party status) with Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 
No. CIV. 00-4036, 2001 WL 1168165, at *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 28, 2001) (arguing that “[t]he Settlement 
Agreement in this case is not a formal consent decree.  But to read Buckhannon to require one 
particular form for resolving a dispute in order to become a prevailing party is to read the opinion 
too narrowly”).  “As the Supreme Court noted, a consent decree often does not include an admission 
of liability, but it is a court-ordered change in the relationship between the parties.”  Id.  The court 
held that the settlement agreement in this case did the same thing.  Id. 
 183. E.g., J.C. v. Reg. Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying as valid the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the IEP determination was more like a judicial consent decree than like a 
private settlement); Luis R. v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4798, 2002 WL 54544, at 
*2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002) (holding the mediation agreement between the parties was nothing 
more than a private settlement and that private settlement agreements do not confer prevailing party 
status); Toms v. Taft, No. C2-00-190, 2001 WL 1681120, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2001) (holding 
the agreement was purely private and the court did not rule or give an order on the merits). 
 184. E.g., Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, No. 00-56479, 2002 WL 54635, at *4 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 16, 2002) (holding the plaintiff prevailed when he entered into a legally enforceable settlement 
agreement against the defendant which eventually stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice); 
Christina A. v. Bloomberg, No. CIV. 00-4036, 2001 WL 1168165, at *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 28, 2001) 
(holding that the court expressly retained jurisdiction over the matter and had “the necessary judicial 
imprimatur”); Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass’n of Ill., No. 00 C 7363, 2001 WL 
893840, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001) (holding the court’s order that memorialized the AHAI’s 
agreement to dismiss two pending actions was enough to legally alter the relationship between the 
parties). 
 185. Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. CIV.A. MGJ95309, at *3 (D.Md. 
37
Stanley: Buckhannon Board and Care Home
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
STANLEY1.DOC 4/7/03  12:53 PM 
400 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol 36:363 
Northern District of Florida argued that the denial of fees for a private 
settlement was merely dicta in Buckhannon, and it may still be possible 
to recover attorney fees under the catalyst theory when dealing with 
settlements.187 
Other steps in the judicial process have come under scrutiny as to 
when judicial involvement was sufficient to award attorney fees.188  
Following Buckhannon, a mooted claim does not give rise to ‘prevailing 
party’ status.189  Courts in various jurisdictions have held that 
Buckhannon could not be extended to award fees for a voluntary 
dismissal with prejudice,190 a remand,191 a preliminary injunction,192 a 
preservation of the status quo,193 a unilateral status determination 
                                                                                                                                 
Dec. 12, 2001) (holding a partial consent decree is enough for the plaintiff to prevail). 
 186. Smyth v. Rivero, No. 00-2453, 2002 WL 245978, at *1, *7, *13 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2002) 
(holding that a partial settlement was not enough to give the plaintiffs prevailing party status 
because it was incomplete as to the merits of the case and because it did not explicitly incorporate 
the terms of the district court’s order). 
 187. National Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (arguing 
that “any suggestion that fees may not be recovered for a mere private settlement was dictum” and 
that the Court did not explicitly state that fees may not be recovered merely because of merely a 
private settlement); Sang-Jasey & Headley, supra note 169, at *39 (arguing that Buckhannon leaves 
the “door open for using the catalyst theory where the settlement is adopted by a court”). 
 188. See infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text. 
 189. Cycholl v. Principi, No. 00-2454, 2001 WL 1642027, at *4 (Vet. App. Dec. 19, 2001) 
(holding that prevailing party cannot be “based on obtaining a remand” even though the change in 
the law through the enactment of VCAA left the suit moot); Wittlinger v. Wing, 2001 WL 1658106 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1 Dept. Dec. 27, 2001) (holding under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 the denial of attorney fees 
was proper because the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed as moot). 
 190. Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that under the Attorney’s Fee 
Awards Act of 1976, the plaintiff is not a prevailing party based on a voluntary dismissal with 
prejudice). 
 191. E.g., Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, No. 99-07-00393, 
2001 WL 1505087, at *3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 28, 2001) (holding “this Court’s remand order did 
not constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship”); Cycholl v. Principi, 
No. 00-2454, 2001 WL 1642027, at *4 (Vet. App. Dec. 19, 2001) (holding that prevailing party 
cannot be “based on obtaining a remand” because of a change in the law by the enactment of 
VCAA).  But cf. Babich, supra note 146 (arguing that a remand is a court order that is entered in the 
plaintiff’s case and it changes the rights between the plaintiff and the defendant). 
 192. John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, No. CIV.A. 98-5781, 2001 WL 1391500, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2001) (holding a preliminary injunction was not enough to sustain an award 
of attorney fees for the prevailing party). 
 193. Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 3-85-CV-1210-R, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 18, 2001) (holding that although plaintiffs had achieved the “preservation of the status quo 
ante,” it did not constitute a judgment in their favor, a necessary prerequisite to establishing a 
party’s entitlement to fee-shifting as a prevailing party).  Compare Cole v. Dep’t of Justice, No. AT-
0752-00-0495-A-1, 90 M.S.P.R. 627 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 20, 2001) (holding that a rescission of an 
action by an agency, which returned the appellant to the status quo ante, did not make the plaintiff a 
prevailing party because it lacked the necessary judicial imprimatur); Sacco v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 
DC-0752-00-0136-A-1, 2001 WL 1347228 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 18, 2001) (holding that the agency’s 
unilateral rescission of a suspension of the appellant did not make the appellant a prevailing party); 
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proceeding,194 an offer of judgment under Rule 68,195 or a stipulation 
granting accommodations.196  The courts held that the plaintiffs 
prevailed by attaining a default judgment or a settlement order issued by 
a hearing officer.197  A judicial pronouncement where the defendant had 
violated the Constitution and judicial relief was ordered proved enough 
to prevail in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 198  So 
far, the two courts that addressed the retention of jurisdiction over a 
settlement split as to whether the plaintiff was prevailing.199  Two other 
courts differed on fees for monitoring a consent decree.200  A court has 
yet to revisit whether a plaintiff prevails through arbitration and would 
then be entitled to attorney’s fees.201 
                                                                                                                                 
Nichols v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. PH-0752-99-0313-A-1, 2001 WL 1090258 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 
4, 2001) (holding “the agency’s voluntary change in conduct . . . although accomplishing what the 
appellant sought to receive by filing an appeal with the Board, lacks the necessary judicial 
imprimatur”). 
 194. Belk v. Capacchione, 274 F.3d 814 at 814-15 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 2001) (Wilkinson, C.J., 
concurring) (concurring in denial of reconsideration of attorney fees and holding fees were not 
awardable under a unitary status determination proceeding to prove whether the school district was 
in compliance with federal law). 
 195. Aynes v. Space Guard Products, Inc., No. IP 99-1299-C-B/S, 2001 WL 826823 (S.D.Ind. 
June 23, 2001) (holding that under Rule 68, offers of judgment are neither a judgment on the merits 
nor a court-ordered consent decree and therefore, Buckhannon is not dispositive in determining 
whether or not the plaintiff is a prevailing party). 
 196. Dorfsman v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-0306, 2001 WL 1754726, 
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2001) (holding that although the parties entered into the stipulation, the 
plaintiff voluntarily settled her claim against the defendants and therefore did not have the judicially 
sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship). 
 197. Edwards-DiPasquale v. Wilfran Agricultural Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3818, 2001 WL 
1632122 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2001) (holding that obtaining a default judgment is enough to award 
attorney fees to the plaintiff as the prevailing party); Brandon K v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 
4625, 2001 WL 1491499, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2001) (holding that the legal relationship 
between the parties changed when the settlement terms by an agreed order were issued by the 
impartial hearing officer and therefore the plaintiff can prevail). 
 198. Dews v. The Town of Sunnyvale, No. 3:88-CV-1604-R, 2001 WL 1032194, at *2 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 24, 2001) (deciding that the plaintiff was a prevailing party because the court had issued 
a judicial pronouncement that had explicit findings of liability against the defendant even though the 
relief had not yet been determined). 
 199. Compare Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 CIV 10900 DLC, 2002 WL 253950, (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 21, 2002), at *1 (holding that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties when the court agreed to 
retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement because the agreement was not a judicial 
sanctioning of the alteration of the legal relationship between the parties) with Christina A. v. 
Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094 at 1098 (D.S.D. 2001) (holding that the court expressly retained 
jurisdiction over the matter and had “the necessary judicial imprimatur”). 
 200. Compare Burt v. Contra Costa, No. C-73-0906, 2001 WL 1135433, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 20, 2001) (holding that it would be inconsistent to extend Buckhannon to the monitoring and 
enforcing of a consent decree without some sort of judicial intervention) with Hispanics United of 
DuPage County v. Village of Addison, 157 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (allowing plaintiff 
attorney fees for monitoring and enforcing a consent decree). 
 201. MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 21.4 (3) 
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The Third Circuit was extremely sympathetic to the appellant in a 
partially moot civil rights action.202  The court concluded that the 
appellant could still receive attorney fees because portions of the 
appellees’ policies were unconstitutional based on a declaratory 
judgment initiated by the appellees.203  They interpreted Buckhannon as 
allowing attorney fees to a prevailing party who “is one who has been 
awarded some relief by the court” and concluded that the appellant’s had 
met the test.204  The District Court for the District of Massachusetts held 
a plaintiff that still had an action for damages could receive attorney fees 
even though the defendant’s voluntary actions mooted the rest of the 
plaintiff’s claims.205 
E.  Effect on Other Fee-shifting Statutes 
1.  Statutes with Wording Similar to the ADA & the FHAA 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that they have interpreted fee-
                                                                                                                                 
(Nov. 2001) available at WESTLAW, EMPLL S 21.4 (citing Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of 
Labor, 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) (allowing a plaintiff to prevail based on an arbitration 
agreement)). 
 202. County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
“that events which occurred subsequent to the contested orders render this appeal moot as to the 
Nationalist Movement’s claim of right to use the courthouse steps and lawn, though not as to the 
question of attorney’s fees”).  The County of Morris brought a declaratory judgment in state court to 
determine the constitutionality of its policies regarding the private use of county facilities in the face 
of threatened litigation by the Nationalist Movement who wanted to hold a parade and rally in 
Morristown on July 4, 2000.  Id.  The Nationalist Movement then removed the case to the district 
court and filed a counterclaim alleging violations of its First Amendment rights as well as an 
application for permanent and preliminary injunctions, compensatory and punitive damages, 
attorney’s fees, and declaratory relief.  Id. at *2.  On July 4, 2000, the Nationalist Movement held its 
parade and rally but it did not enter onto the county facilities.  Id. at *3.  The district court denied 
the Nationalist Movement’s application for attorney fees for its role as a defendant in the 
declaratory judgment.  Id. at *4. 
 203. Id. at 536 (holding that the Nationalist Movement “indisputably prevailed on significant 
issues in the present action to the extent that portions of policy 4:1.01 were held unconstitutional” 
therefore the Nationalist Movement was a prevailing party and should be awarded attorney fees 
because of the declaratory judgment).  The Third Circuit dismissed as moot the National 
Movement’s counterclaim pertaining to the county facilities.  Id. at *5.  The court felt that National 
Movement’s counterclaim was identical to the declaratory judgment and the Nationalist Movement 
was nominally the defendant rather than the plaintiff and, therefore, was entitled to prevail under § 
1988.  Id. 
 204. Morris, 273 F.3d 527, 529 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S.C. 598, 603 (2001)). 
 205. Homier Distributing Co., Inc. v. City of New Bedford, 188 F. Supp. 2d 33, *2 (D. Mass. 
2002) (holding the defendant’s ordinance was in violation of the Commerce Clause, therefore the 
plaintiff was a prevailing party based on the damages claim even though part of the case was 
mooted due to the rescinding of the law). 
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shifting statutes consistently and this has had a direct effect on many of 
the fee-shifting statutes containing the term ‘prevailing party.’206  While 
Buckhannon only addressed the ADA and the FHAA,207 courts have 
used the Buckhannon decision to support the denial of fees under fee-
shifting statutes of similar language.208  Courts have also addressed the 
prevailing party status in the National Voter Registration Act,209 the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,210 the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act,211 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,212 and the Civil Right’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 n.4; Bucholtz, supra note 163, at 326 (noting that the 
ruling’s ramifications implicate all federal statutes with fee-shifting provisions); Sisk, supra note 
10, at 262 (acknowledging “[t]he meaning of ‘prevailing party’ under the EAJA is the same as 
under other fee-shifting statutes”); Perry A. Zirkel, Commentary, Special Education Law Update 
VII, 160 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2002) (deciding that rejection of the catalyst theory under the 
ADA extended to other federal statutes that authorize attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in the 
absence of clear contrary Congressional intent). 
 207. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601 (recognizing plaintiffs requested attorney’s fees under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendment Act).  E.g., Richardson v. 
Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding “we are constrained to follow the Court’s broad 
directive and join several of our sister circuits in concluding that the catalyst theory may no longer 
be used to award attorney’s fees under the Fees Act”); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 
(9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that the Court’s analysis in Buckhannon applies 
to statutes other than the two at issue in that case.  Specifically, the provision at issue in this case, 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, was cited by the Court as a 
‘nearly identical’ to the two at issue in Buckhannon.”). 
 208. See supra notes 29 & 33 and infra notes 209-14 for examples of fee-shifting statutes. 
 209. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg-9 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 
2001) (stating that “In a civil action . . . the court may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney 
fees”); National Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279 (N.D. 
Fla. 2001) (holding the plaintiffs are prevailing because the settlement agreement and the resulting 
order were a material alteration in the legal relationships). 
 210. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (i)(3)(B) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 
2001) (stating “the court . . . may award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs to the parents 
of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party”).  E.g., J.C. v. Reg. Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 
119 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying as valid the plaintiffs’ argument that the IEP determination was more 
like a judicial consent decree than like a private settlement under the IDEA); Baer v. Klagholz, 786 
A.2d 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (allowing attorney fees under the Federal Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act for challenging eight regulations but not for securing the 
amendment of 15 others); J.S. v. Rampo Central Sch. Dist., No. 01 CIV 0238, 2001 WL 1180923, at 
*1, *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2001) (holding that after Buckhannon, the agreement entered into by 
the plaintiffs and defendants was merely a private settlement, and since no order was issued by the 
Impartial Hearing Officer, no attorney fees were awardable). 
  See also, John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, No. CIV.A. 98-5781, 2001 WL 
1391500, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that the plaintiff tried to argue that IDEA cases contained 
different incentives for settlement compared to the FHAA and the ADA in Buckhannon).  The court 
held that Buckhannon did apply and denied the fee award.  Id. at *8. 
 211. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001).  
The fee-shifting section states: “On a finding by the court . . . the court shall award to the prevailing 
party attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended.”  Id.; Crabill v. Trans Union, 
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Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.213 
The Equal Access to Justice Act has been the focus of much of the 
latest litigation over ‘prevailing party’ status because the statute 
contained sections of dissimilar language relating to attorney fees.214  
Most courts have generally held that Buckhannon’s prevailing party 
definition applies to the Equal Access to Justice Act and have followed 
the trend of other similarly worded fee-shifting statutes.215  The United 
                                                                                                                                 
L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that there was nothing in the “text, structure, or 
legislative history . . . to suggest that its attorneys’ fee provision has a different meaning from the 
provision at issue in Buckhannon”). 
 212. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 
2001) (stating “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s 
fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs”) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Rodriguez, Nos. 00-
50443, 00-50570, 2001 WL 845180 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing the award of attorney fees under Title 
VII based only on the catalyst theory); Aynes v. Space Guard Products, Inc., No. IP 99-1299-C-B/S, 
2001 WL 826823 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party under Title 
VII because no material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties). 
 213. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001) 
(declaring “the court . . . may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee”); Bennett v. 
Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Buckhannon decision applied to 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 and that the catalyst theory was no longer 
allowed). 
 214. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(D) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 
2001).  The statute requires fee awards to be given to “the party” to “a civil action brought by the 
United States” when the demand by the United States substantially exceeds the judgment obtained 
by the United States.  Compare Id., with 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West, WESTLAW through 
P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001).  The pertinent part reads: “Except as otherwise specifically 
provided by statute, a court shall award prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by 
that party . . . unless the court finds that the circumstances make an award unjust.”  28 U.S.C.A. § 
2412(d)(1)(A) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001). 
 215. E.g., Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that under the EAJA, 
the plaintiff was not a prevailing party because neither a judgment nor a consent decree occurred 
and the language of the EAJA was not dissimilar to the language of the ADA or FHAA, therefore 
the Buckhannon decision precluded the use of the catalyst theory under the EAJA); Miller v. Apfel, 
No. Civ. A. 300CV0107M, 2001 WL 1142763, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2001) (holding that a 
party is entitled to recover attorney’s fees under the EAJA if plaintiff is found to be a prevailing 
party under the Buckhannon decision). 
  Courts have held that prevailing party status attached to an order of dismissal but not to a 
stipulation of dismissal.  North Carolina Alliance for Transportation Reform, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transportation, 151 F. Supp. 2d 661 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (holding that the order of dismissal was 
enough to make the plaintiffs a prevailing party because it embodies a significant portion of the 
relief the plaintiffs sought in the action); Former Employees of Motorola Ceramics Products v. 
United States, No. 99-07-00393, 2001 WL 1505087, at *3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 28, 2001) (holding 
the stipulation for dismissal does not meet the prevailing party plateau for attorney fees because it 
did not include a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship); Alcocer v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., No. 300CV2015-H, 2001 WL 1142807, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 21, 2001) (holding that because the court did not consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, 
the INS adjustment of the claimant’s status was not a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered 
consent decree, and in the totality of the circumstances, the claimant did not prevail).  See also, 
United States v. One 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, 248 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding to 
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States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has been the battleground 
for many of the issues regarding ‘prevailing party’ status under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act, but they too have followed the Buckhannon 
decision and the trends of the other courts.216  The ruling in Buckhannon 
has also affected how ‘prevailing party’ is interpreted in state 
proceedings when the state law makes fees awardable based on 
‘prevailing party’ status.217  It has added complexity for federal courts in 
                                                                                                                                 
determine under the EAJA the claimant’s eligibility for attorney fees under the “special 
circumstances that could make an award unjust” and vacating a previous award of fees as the 
claimant was not prevailing under the Buckhannon standard as to a judgment but may be prevailing 
as to a settlement).  For the general trends in similar fee-shifting statutes, see supra notes 182-205 
and the accompanying text. 
  Contra, Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738, 747 (Jan. 29, 
2001) (holding that the Buckhannon interpretation of prevailing party does not resolve the 
interpretation of prevailing party in the EAJA).  The court found “the court shall award to a 
prevailing party . . . fees” in the EAJA, which is distinguishable from “the court . . . may allow the 
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee” found in both the ADA and the FHAA.  Id. at 745-
746.  They also noted that the Court did not mention the EAJA and so Buckhannon could not be 
used to resolve the interpretation of prevailing party under the EAJA.  Id. at 745.  The court felt that 
by requiring formal written judgment as in Buckhannon, it would “inhibit settlements and 
discourage parties from taking self-corrective action. . . .”  Id. at 749.  For those reasons, it declined 
to bar recovery for the plaintiff of attorney fees after the Buckhannon decision.  Id. 
 216. Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 204 (Vet. App. Sept. 4, 2001) (holding that the catalyst 
theory is no longer available to achieve prevailing party status under the EAJA); Belton v. Principi, 
No. 98-1225, 2001 WL 1564308, (Vet. App. Nov. 13, 2001) (holding that under the EAJA the term 
‘prevailing party’ cannot be distinguished from the interpretation in Buckhannon, therefore the 
plaintiff did not prevail).  In this court, the burden of showing prevailing party status lies on the 
EAJA applicant.  Id. 
  An EAJA application for attorney fees must contain (1) a showing that the applicant is a 
prevailing party; (2) a showing that he is a party eligible for an award because his net worth does 
not exceed $2,000,000; (3) an allegation that the Secretary’s position was not substantially justified; 
and (4) an itemized statement of the attorney fees sought.  Times v. Principi, No. 00-2406, 2001 WL 
1751503, at *1 (Vet. App. Jan. 23, 2001) (holding the Secretary’s position was not substantially 
justified and the appellant was entitled to attorney fees).  See also, Hatzenbuhler v. Principi, No. 00-
2332, 2001 WL 1751397, at *2 (Vet. App. Jan. 23, 2001) (holding that the Secretary had not met his 
burden to demonstrate that his position at the administrative stage was substantially justified); Sachs 
v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 414 (Vet. App. Feb. 6, 2002) (holding that the plaintiff was not a 
prevailing party under Sumner because the disposition of the party’s appeal did not result in a 
remand predicated on an administrative error); Westre v. Principi, No. 00-2396, 2002 WL 167991, 
at *1-*2 (Vet. App. Jan. 18, 2002) (holding that the remand of the appellant’s claim was predicated 
on an administrative error and the Secretary did not meet his burden to demonstrate that his position 
at the administrative stage was substantially justified, therefore qualifying the appellant qualifies as 
a prevailing party); Sumner v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 404 (Vet. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (Kramer, J., 
concurring) (concurring in the denial of fees because neither a judicial imprimatur on the change nor 
a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties was present in the case); 
Sumner v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 256 (Vet. App. Nov. 6, 2001) (holding that the remand did not 
make the appellant a prevailing party because the remand was not predicated upon an administrative 
error). 
 217. Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard’s Dairy, 258 Conn. 299, 303 (Conn. Oct. 9, 2001) (holding 
based on Buckhannon the plaintiff was a prevailing party because a judgment had been ordered in 
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the interpretation of state laws concerning ‘prevailing party’ status and 
whether or not the catalyst theory is still viable.218 
2.  Statutes with Wording Dissimilar to Buckhannon 
Many fee-shifting statutes allow attorney fees “whenever . . . 
appropriate” but do not contain ‘prevailing party’ in their language.219  
Fortunately for plaintiffs, most courts have held that the wording of 
these statutes on their face was distinguishable from the ADA and 
FHAA, and, therefore, the ruling in Buckhannon did not apply.220 
Courts held that Buckhannon did not apply to the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,221 which allows for an award 
of reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party, because 
of dissimilar language.222  Under the Endangered Species Act, 223 both 
                                                                                                                                 
his favor); Auguste v. Hammons, 727 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 1 Dept. July 26, 2001) (noting the 
decision in Buckhannon added support to their standard for prevailing party that a judgment on the 
merits was needed and that the catalyst theory was rejected); Taylor v. Lenoir, No. COA99-1228-3, 
2002 WL 46930, at *7 (N.C. App. Jan. 15, 2002) (holding that where a lawsuit, the merits of which 
have never been determined, brings about a voluntary change in a defendant’s conduct, and where 
that change in conduct results in financial benefits for certain plaintiff class members, the plaintiffs 
were not prevailing and therefore could not obtain attorney fees under the North Carolina state 
retirement system); but cf. Desalvo v. Bryant, No. S-9827, 2001 WL 227309 (Alaska Feb. 15, 2002) 
(allowing the catalyst theory to determine if a plaintiff is prevailing under a settlement agreement by 
settling the claim and achieving the goal of the lawsuit). 
 218. Richardson, 279 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that there is not a single case where the 
Massachusetts courts have recognized the catalyst theory for state law claims). 
 219. E.g., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 
107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001) (declaring that “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable 
attorney’s fee . . . to either party); EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1132 (g) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001) (stating that 
“the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . to either party); Babich, supra 
note 146 (noting several important fee-shifting statutes that provide for fee awards when the court 
deems an award appropriate including CAA §§ 304(d) and 307(f); Endangered Species Act § 
11(g)(4); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d); Toxic Substances Control Act § 20(c)(2); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520(d); Deepwater Ports Act § 16(d); Act to Prevent Water 
Pollution From Ships § 1910(d); Noise Control Act § 12(d); Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act § 105(g)(4); and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a)(5)). 
 220. Babich, supra note 146 (noting certain provisions do not provide for awards of fees to 
prevailing parties). 
 221. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 2001) 
(declaring “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . to either party). 
 222. E.g., Davenport v. Abrams, No. 98 CIV. 8327 (LAK), 2001 WL 694574, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2001).  This court recognized that the  
Second Circuit ha[d] fashioned a five-factor test to determine attorney’s fees under 
Section 1132 (g): (1) the degree of the offending party’s culpability or bad faith, (2) the 
ability of the offending party to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees, (3) whether an award 
of fees would deter other persons from acting similarly under like circumstances, (4) the 
relative merits of the parties’ positions, and (5) whether the action conferred a common 
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the Central District Court of California224 and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals225 declared that the catalyst theory is still a viable option for 
awarding attorney fees where the statutes did not contain the ‘prevailing 
party’ language.226  Therefore, the catalyst theory appears to be viable 
for the statutes that allow fees when the court deems an award 
appropriate.227 
                                                                                                                                 
benefit on a group of pension plan participants.   
Id. at *3.  The court decided that because the language of the statute did not include ‘prevailing 
party,’ Buckhannon did not apply.  Id.  Cf. Hu, supra note 28, at 220-21 & 229-30 (discussing the 
five factors, their application in ERISA cases and proposing a legal merits test). 
 223. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(4) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89, approved Dec. 18, 
2001) (stating “[t]he court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought [by civil litigant] may 
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, 
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate”). 
 224. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944, 947 (C.D. Cal 
2001) (finding the language in the Endangered Species Act distinguishable from the language of the 
statutes in Buckhannon).  Additionally, the court concluded that the legislative history of the 
Endangered Species Act, like the Clean Air Act, demonstrated that the catalyst theory should be a 
permissible way to award fees.  Id. at 947.  They determined that because the Supreme Court relied 
on the plain meaning of prevailing party and the lack of any mention of the Endangered Species Act 
or other environmental statutes, the holding of Buckhannon should not be extended to statutes that 
were dissimilar on their face.  Id. at 948.  Therefore, they concluded that in the absence of the 
Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit overruling the catalyst theory for lawsuits under the Endangered 
Species Act or other environmental statutes, it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion 
and award attorney fees.  Id. at 948. 
 225. Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1077 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the catalyst theory was still permitted under the Endangered Species Act but that the Center had 
failed to demonstrate that its lawsuit was a catalyst in causing the Secretary of Interior to take 
action).  The plaintiffs brought an action of injunctive relief to force the Secretary of the Interior to 
list the Arkansas River shiner as an endangered species.  Id.  Similar to Buckhannon, the suit 
became moot and the plaintiffs filed for litigation costs that included attorney’s fees.  Id.  The court 
cited Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995) that under 
the CLEAN WATER ACT, 30 U.S.C. § 1270, the catalyst test that a “claimant seeking attorney 
fees . . . must demonstrate that it was the catalyst behind the change in the defendant’s conduct” 
even when “there has been no adjudication on the merits.”  Center for Biological Diversity, 262 
F.3d at 1077.  Because both parties advocated the use of the catalyst theory under the Endangered 
Species Act, the court assumed its applicability to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) because the wording in 
the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act was virtually the same.  Id.  The court then 
determined that the Center had failed to show a causal link between the lawsuit and the action taken 
by the Secretary of the Interior.  Id. at *5. 
 226. Center for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d 1077 (holding that the Court’s conclusion in 
Buckhannon about the term prevailing party is not applicable to the case at hand under the 
Endangered Species Act); Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 948 
(declining to extend the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Buckhannon to the Endangered Species 
Act). 
 227. Babich, supra note 146 (arguing that the catalyst theory is still alive in most 
environmental statutes).  But see, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) where the 
Supreme Court discussed the appropriateness standard under the Clean Air Act and held that 
“absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not ‘appropriate’ for a federal 
court to award attorney’s fees under § 307(f).”  Id. at 694.  It expanded the Clean Air Act to allow 
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F.  A Call to Congress to Respond 
The concurring opinion encouraged Congress to make clear what 
prevailing party really meant.228  Based on Buckhannon, another option 
for legislators is to change the language of the statutes to allow for fees 
‘when appropriate’ and eliminate the ‘prevailing party’ requirement.229  
Either of these approaches might allow the revival of the catalyst theory 
in fee-shifting statutes containing ‘prevailing party’ language.  Congress 
responded after Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. and hopefully, they will heed 
this call and respond to help plaintiffs enforce their rights.230 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Buckhannon ruling will have far reaching effects on litigants as 
they prepare to battle over violations under fee-shifting statutes.231  It has 
increased the threshold that a plaintiff must reach to prevail through a 
bright-line rule and has denied the courts much of their discretion in 
awarding fees.232  The judicial system faces continued struggles in 
deciding when the court has been involved enough and when awards of 
attorney fees are appropriate.233  It affects both statutes of similar and 
dissimilar language and, thus, the catalyst theory is not dead, but it is 
                                                                                                                                 
attorney fees to parties achieving some success, even if not major success.  Id. at 688.  Section 
307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f), allowed an award of fees in certain proceedings 
“whenever [the court] determines that such an award is appropriate.”  Id. at 681-82. 
 228. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating “Congress is free . . . to 
revise these provisions”). 
 229. See Babich, supra note 146 (arguing that the “catalyst theory should remain viable under 
fee-shifting statutes that rely on the ‘whenever appropriate standard’”); Coyle, supra note 135 
(acknowledging that public interest groups hope to still be able to use the catalyst theory under all of 
the federal environmental statutes but the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). 
 230. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1977); Comment, Civil 
Rights Attorneys’ Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent and Federal Statutory Grounds, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 488, 488-89 (1981) (stating that Supreme Court returned fee-shifting statute 
determinations to Congress for further guidance).  The Supreme Court in Alyeska concluded that it 
was Congress’s job to decide what the circumstances should be to award attorney’s fees and the 
range of awards that should be given.  Id. In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976 with the prevailing party status in the statutory provisions.  Id. at 489.  
Maybe Congress will respond once again.  See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the 
Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. R. 800, 803 (arguing that law students should 
“learn about the frequency and feasibility of legislative overruling of judicial decisions that interpret 
statutes contrary to the purpose of the legislation as conceived by either the enacting Congress or a 
subsequent one.”).  Contra Coyle, supra note 135 (alleging that most civil rights attorneys are not 
optimistic about the chance that Congress will respond and overturn the Buckhannon ruling). 
 231. See supra notes 160-227 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 182-227 and accompanying text. 
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/5
STANLEY1.DOC 4/7/03  12:53 PM 
2003] BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME 409 
severely stifled.234  There is hope, though, that Congress may respond as 
it did in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.235 and ease the expense for plaintiffs 
that try to vindicate their rights and the rights of the public for the public 
good.236 
Robin Stanley 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 234. See supra notes 206-27 and accompanying text. 
 235. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1977).  See supra notes 
228-30 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. 
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